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Foreword 
Accounting for more than 18 million enterprise units in the European Union and with an employment 
share of about 66%, SMES play an important role for the European economy and in particular for 
the development of new products and services, economic growth and, finally, job creation.  Their 
specific contribution to the European economy, due to their flexibility, their innovation capacity and 
their employment potential, is also well acknowledged. However, the emergence and development of 
SMES are closely related to the financial sources they are able to access. In Europe, the main stream 
of external financing for SMES is still debt. Only  very few of them are active in equity markets. The 
importance of finance, and particularly of own funds, for the growth of young and small enterprise 
with high innovation capacity, is also well recognised. But SMES traditionally have to cope with a 
series of hurdles in their search for external financing, compared with large companies. This is 
essentially due to the fact that they stand a higher risk of failure. Consequently, SMES have generally 
to bear higher costs of external financing, or even, in certain cases, financial rationing and therefore, a 
constraint on their growth potential.  
From an academic point of view, after having been a neglected branch of economics for a long while 
in Europe, entrepreneurship and SMES have for several years enjoyed a clear-cut renewal of 
interest. Numerous factors explain this abrupt change such as the expansion of new technologies, the 
need for organisational flexibility, or the search for decision making at a micro-unit level. 
Consequently many studies have already been made in this field, especially on the financing of SMES 
in comparison with LES.  
The objective of this study is to make a new analytical contribution to this debate. It notably stresses 
the need for financial flexibility for SMES, an issue that has been largely ignored. Making use of the 
BACH data base for the period 1990-1996 and dealing with manufacturing industry of 9 countries 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Japan and the United States) it analyses 
the financial structures and the performances of small and medium-sized versus large enterprises. Its 
main conclusions are the following. 
Regarding profitability, there are distinctive features of SMES compared to LES. SMES indeed 
show a higher efficiency of capital employed and a higher degree of product transformation. 
Consequently, the profitability of SMES as measured by gross profits over capital employed is larger 




Regarding financial patterns, there are less clear-cut differences according to size. SMES have less 
own funds in Austria, Germany, Portugal and Japan while this is not the case in France, Italy and 
Spain. However, in most countries, the importance of short-term financial debt is higher for SMES 
than for LES, a feature which is correlated with their higher working capital requirement. It is also 
noticeable that the smaller firms support a risk premium on their indebtedness, mainly because of a 
lack of information on the risk they represent. 
There is no link between financial structure and profitability. Consequently, measures taken to 
improve the access of SMES to capital markets are not expected to increase their profitability but 
their solvency. However such measures are important to promote development of high-growth 
innovative SMES. 
SMES maximise profitability by adapting quickly to the changing needs of the market, thus they give 
priority to short-term management and flexibility. SMES also need financial flexibility -defined as the 
capacity to mobilise rapidly and at reasonable cost the financing required to respond to contingencies 
which have an impact on the current assets- to cope with unexpected changes in their day-to-day 
economic activity.  
As a result of this need for financial flexibility it is vital for SME to have good relationships with their 
banks and to be inserted in networks which contribute to improve these relationships. Indeed, banks 
are the main supplier of short-term credit and may provide a borrowing capacity which releases an 
enterprise from corporate financial constraints. The relationship between SMES and their banks can 
be improved in several ways (improve information on SMES, improve the functioning of the bank 
credit guarantees for SMES). A network of private actors as well as of public organisations which 
supply funds, provide financial guarantees and additional information, evaluate the quality of the 
borrower and thus help to reduce the costs of screening and rating, is also important for dealing with 
the issue of financial flexibility. 
From a policy perspective, this last conclusion is fully in line with the initiatives of the European 
Commission in the field of SMES and access to external financing. Indeed, the European 
Commission has elaborated a two-handed approach in this area. Firstly, it has promoted the setting 
up of Round Tables of Bankers and SMES. Within the framework of such Round Tables 
representatives from both parties have tried to identify the main problems they face when they are in 
business relations and to highlight a range of best practices across the European Union. This has led 
to concrete results in the field of micro-credit, transfer of enterprises or the development of several 
banking products and services in favour of SMES among many other initiatives. Secondly, in 
response to the request of the Luxembourg European Council on Employment in 1997, the 
Commission proposed a Risk Capital Action Plan (“Risk Capital : a key to job creation” –SEC (98) 
552-) comprising measures to remove barriers to the development  of an efficient EU market for risk 
capital. The special Lisbon European Council (March 2000) identified the development of a pan-
European market for risk capital as a important way of providing a source of equity financing for 
young and innovative firms, as they generally face difficulties to access credit. It also called for the 




Comparison between the financial structure of SMEs and that of large 
enterprises using the BACH database 
 
SUMMARY 
This study examines the financial structures and the performances of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) as opposed to large enterprises (LEs) on the basis of the BACH database, 
which is the most advanced publicly available database for comparisons in this field. 
It covers the period 1990-1996 and concerns 9 countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Japan and the United States. It deals with manufacturing only since this industry 
provides the best-quality data. 
The first point to consider is the role played by SMEs in Europe. SMEs are not merely a ‘scale 
model’ of a large corporation. Their specific contribution to the European economy, due to their 
flexibility, their innovativeness and their employment potential, is already firmly recognised,
1 as is the 
importance of finance, and particularly of own funds, for the growth of young and small enterprises 
with high innovative capacity. Conversely, the issue of financial flexibility is largely ignored. Flexibility 
is important because a company must be able to take advantages of customers’ needs and also 
because in their day-to-day activity SMEs encounter uncertainty and need to react quickly to 
unexpected events. The need to have financing available in order to seize unexpected market 
opportunities or to react to external shocks is particularly important for the vitality of SMEs. New 
opportunities for selling products, for instance, affect current assets first but their growth may not be 
sustainable. It is assumed that there would be various ways of financing such assets, either internally 
via own funds or externally through banks in the main. Hence, the issue of flexibility is the point of 
departure for this report (Chapter I). 
The descriptive study of the determinants of SME profitability versus LE profitability shows structural 
differences that transcend nationality (Chapter II.1). Small and medium-sized enterprises have the 
following advantages: 
- a higher rate of value added as a proportion of fixed assets, 
- a higher degree of product transformation. 
Their comparative handicaps are: 
- a higher rate of staff costs, 
- a higher working capital requirement (stocks and net trade debtors). 
The first three features can be related to a less capital-intensive orientation as they focus on products, 
technologies and types of organisation that encourage rapid capital rotation; this tendency favours 
                                                 




profitability while handicapping labour productivity; the fourth feature results in part from 
inter-business relationships, which favour large enterprises. The last two features indicate how the 
behaviour of SMEs can be flexible.  
As we turn to financial patterns (Chapter II.2), specific national features of the financial system have 
a strong impact on company behaviour so that there are few, if any, regularities according to size. In 
the European countries SMEs have an own funds ratio that is either lower than or equal to that of 
their larger counterparts. In most countries the importance of short-term (as opposed to long-term) 
financial debt is greater for SMEs than for LEs, a feature which correlates with their higher working 
capital requirement.  
Principal component analysis and cluster analysis contribute to a more in-depth study of financial 
structures (Chapter III). The main results are the following: 
–  financial structure differs mostly according to country, with that of small enterprises being more 
typified than that of larger ones; 
–  the selected indicators of performance and profitability (mark-up, profitability of own funds, etc.) 
do not correlate with any specific pattern of financing; in other words, firms with above-average 
performance are not characterised by a higher level of own funds, and higher indebtedness does 
not correlate with lower profitability; 
–  the way in which current assets are financed does not depend on the level of own funds; 
therefore, a highly capitalised firm (a feature which correlates, of course, with a low level of 
long-term debt) may rely on short-term financial indebtedness, mainly from banks. 
Chapter IV returns to the determinants of profitability on the assumption that SMEs do not behave 
like LEs and that a given rate of profit may be achieved using separate models. It is assumed that, in 
the ‘market-based’ profit formation model, the enterprise gives priority to short-term management 
and flexibility while, in the ‘organisation-based’ model, the enterprise prioritises maximisation of 
labour productivity and stability of growth. The ‘market-based’ model is well suited to SMEs. 
Chapter V (Recommendations) focuses on the issue of financial flexibility, defined as the capacity to 
mobilise rapidly and at reasonable cost the financing required to respond to contingencies. Although 
the need for available financing may be covered by own funds or by any kind of long-term funds, a 
good relationship with banks matters. Banks are the main suppliers of short-term credit and may 
provide a borrowing capacity that eases corporate financial constraints. A network of private actors 
as well as of public organisations which supply funds, provide financial guarantees and evaluate the 




CHAPTER I : SURVEY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISON 
Studies of financing systems traditionally distinguish between systems geared to the market and those 
geared to banks. The first section of this survey aims to highlight the lack of strong statistical evidence 
which would illustrate this distinction. The second section shows that the normal explanatory 
variables of this canonical distinction have low explanatory power. The framework we apply is 
described in the third section. 
1.  INTER-COUNTRY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF CAPITAL STRUCTURES DO NOT 
PRODUCE RELIABLE RESULTS 
One can hardly fail to notice that the results of international comparisons of capital structures yield 
conclusions which are not reliable. Those results are very much influenced by databases, the choice 
of capital structure indicators, data recalculation and the period of observation. If we look at 
European countries alone, the results of international comparisons give an image of non-financial 
companies there which lacks clarity; they are summarised in Table I.1, which lists publications since 
1990 (source: European Committee of Central Balance Sheet Offices, Working Group on Net 
Equity). Studies based on specific samples of listed companies all show German companies as 
having low leverage. Conversely, studies based on broadly representative samples show French 
companies as being the most highly capitalised and the least leveraged in Europe. The situation of 
Italian companies also varies, and their level of net equity may come out as similar to that of French 
companies or, on the contrary, as the lowest of all the countries studied. 
To sum up, differences are due mainly to the degree of representativeness of the sample. Large 
companies, through a structural effect, contribute in a very large measure to the computation of 
weighted average ratios; they have all the more impact on the results obtained from aggregate data 
since they tend to be overrepresented in the samples. 
The results also depend on the way in which data is restated for harmonisation purposes. The 
Bundesbank shows that, once the main differences in method have been dealt with, the levels of net 
equity of German, Italian, Spanish and French companies are similar when aggregates (BACH) are 
used (Bundesbank, 1994). Rajan and Zingalez find that Germany and the United Kingdom have the 
least leverage and that the leverage figures for companies in the other G-7 nations are convergent; 
they justifiably underline the sensitivity of the results to the ratio chosen as the yardstick for leverage 






Table I.1 Overview of the main research results (studies since 1990) 
Title of document  Databases used  
and countries compared 
Chosen indicators  Period studied, scope and size of sample   Main results 
C.E.V. Borio: "Leverage and financing of non-
financial companies: An international 
perspective", Bank for International Settlements, 
Economic papers, No 27, May 1990. 
-  OECD financial statistics and national fund 
flow statistics. 
- United States, Canada, United Kingdom, 
Japan, Germany, France, Italy. 
a) Debt (gross)/total assets; 
b) Debt (net)/real assets. 
-  1970-1987; 
-  all industrial or commercial companies 
and manufacturing industry; 
-  representative national samples. 
According to indicator (a), leverage higher in 
France than in Germany; according to (b), the 
reverse is true and Italy is similar to Germany. 
E.M. Remolona: "Understanding international 
differences in leverage trends", FRBNY 
Quarterly Review, Spring 1990. 
-  BACH (old version) and Global Vantage 
Data; 
-  France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, 
United States (Italy, Netherlands, Australia). 
Debts/assets.  -  1982-1987 and 1983, 1987; 
-  all companies; 
-  representative national samples and 
limitation of corporations listed on the 
stock market to a small number: 
between 16 companies (France) and 31 
(Germany). 
Leverage higher in France than in Germany and 
Italy; Italy more leveraged than Germany. 
The results using Global Vantage Data confirm 
this observation but show greater differences 
between France and Germany. 
L. Bloch and J. Laudy: "France, Allemagne et 
Belgique: des structures de bilans proches à la 
fin de la décennie quatre-vingt", Économie et 
Statistique Nos 268-269, August-September, 
1993. 
-  BACH (old version); 
-  France, Germany and Belgium. 
a) Net equity (+ 
provisions)/balance- sheet total; 
b) Net equity (+ provisions) / fixed 
assets 
  (historical costs and market 
value). 
-  1985-1991; 
-  manufacturing industry; 
-  representative national samples. 
If provisions in the accounts are included in net 
equity, France shows higher leverage than 
Germany; otherwise, leverage higher in 
Germany.  
Deutsche Bundesbank: "Dotation en fonds 
propres des entreprises: comparaison dans 
quelques pays de la communauté européenne", 
Monthly Bulletin No 10, October 1994. 
-  BACH (old version) and national sources; 
-  Germany, France, Spain, Italy. 
Net equity/balance-sheet total.  -  1982-1991; 
-  manufacturing industry; 
-  national samples. 
If no correction is applied for methodological 
differences between samples and for data 
processing, German firms are less financially 
autonomous than those in other countries; after 
correction, situation similar. 
R.G. Rajan and L. Zingales: “What do we 
know about capital structure? Some evidence 
from international data”, NBER WP No 4875, 
October 1994. 
-  Global Vantage Data;  
-  United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, 
United Kingdom, Canada. 
a) Debts + provisions/total assets;  
b) Debts /total assets; 
c) Debts/net total for assets; 
d) Debts/debts + net equity  
  (median and mean values) 
  (historical costs and market 
value). 
-  1991; 
-  all companies; 
-  limitation to corporations quoted on 
the stock market, ranging from 118 
companies (Italy) to 225 (France). 
According to (a), leverage highest in Germany 
(historical costs), and Italy and France very 
similar; according to (b) (c) and (d), Italy more 
leveraged than France and Germany less than 
France (positive correlation between size and 
leverage with the exception of Germany). 
J.T. Kneeshaw: "A survey of non-financial 
sector balance sheets in industrialised 
countries", Bank of International Settlements, 
Working Paper No 25, April 1995. 
-  National sources: INSEE for France, 
Statistisches Bundesamt for Germany, OECD 
and Banca d’Italia for Italy, OECD and Banco 
de España for Spain; 
-  Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
a) Financial debt/ total assets; 
b) Financial debt + 
provisions/GDP; 
c) Financial debt/GDP; 
d) Net equity/GDP, 
  (market value). 
-  1992; 
-  all non-financial companies; 
-  national samples and macro-economic 
data. 
According to (a), leverage higher in Germany 
than in France; according to the other indicators, 
Italy has least leverage and Germany most; 
financial autonomy greatest in France. 
J. Corbett, T. Jenkinson: "The financing of 
industry, 1970-1989: an international 
comparison", Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economies, 10, 71-96, 1996. 
-  Aggregate corporate data processed on the 
basis of the national accounting standards in 
each country; 
-  Germany, Japan, United States, United 
Kingdom. 
Net resource flows.  -  1970-1989.  -  More use of internal finance in Germany; 
-  More use of equity issues in the United 
Kingdom and United States; 




L. Nayman: "Les structures de financement des 
entreprises en Europe", Économie Internationale 
No 66, second quarter, 1996. 
-  OECD and BACH; 
-  Germany, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. 
a) Credit/GDP; 
b) Balance-sheet structure; 
c) Profitability; 
d) Resource percentage. 
-  1987-1993; 
-  Non-financial companies. 
-  In 1994, credit/GDP higher in Germany and 
Italy, lower in France, very low in United 
Kingdom; 
-  1987-1992, share of external finance higher in 
Germany, in the United Kingdom (short 
term), Italy, lower in France. 
M. Delbreil et al.: "Fonds propres et conditions 
de financement des entreprises en Europe", 
European Committee of Central Balance Sheet 
Offices, 1997. 
-  Balance Sheet Office; 
-  Germany, Austria, Spain, France, Italy. 
Net equity/financial resources.  -  1990-1993 (checked for 1995); 
-  manufacturing industry. 
-  Least leverage in France and Spain; 
-  Germany more leveraged on median values, 
less on aggregate data; 
-  Austria ranked between these positions; 
-  Least favourable position in Italy. 




The choice, or rather the availability, of data and indicators is also of determining importance for 
assessing the effect of size on leverage. Rajan and Zingalez find that leverage correlates positively 
with size in all G-7 countries except Germany. When the database includes both listed and unlisted 
companies, tests often show the opposite: leverage declines along with size in the European countries 
studied (for Germany, see Bundesbank, 1994; for France, see Conseil national du crédit, 1994). 
The influence of size is also sensitive to the number of determinants selected for the econometric 
study. A test on French data shows that the effect of size on capital structure is less clear when other 
factors such as the age of the firms, usually aggregated within the single size variable, are introduced 
simultaneously (Bourdieu et al., 1993).The canonical distinction (market- or bank-oriented) assumes 
that capitalisation is relatively higher in market-based countries than in bank-based countries and 
that, in the first group, financial markets are an important, or at least a not insignificant, source of 
funds for companies while they may be an insignificant source in the second group.2 Corbett and 
Jenkinson set out to demonstrate the difficulty of testing theories of corporate financing by using 
international aggregate data (OECD) (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1996). They compare net sources of 
finance for physical investment (net of depreciation and other financial flows reducing corporate 
resources), according to the method already used, notably by Mayer (Mayer, 1988). They observe 
that, in all the countries considered (United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan), recourse 
to internal resources predominates and that over the period of observation (1970-1989) it increases 
in the first three of the above countries, while the share of finance raised on securities markets falls. It 
is as if market finance were contributing almost exclusively to external growth. The authors conclude 
from this that the canonical distinction between systems of finance no longer accounts for modes of 
financing since these tend to converge towards internal financing, although the distinction remains 
useful in interpreting mechanisms for the control of corporate managers. 
It is thus difficult to verify the intuitive view that the mix of equity and debt differs from country to 
country and from large firms to small ones. The consensus as to the existence of such differences is 
gradually being undermined by the accumulation of empirical studies. It is increasingly reduced to a 
recognition of the existence of different modes of corporate control, which is confirmed, 
unambiguously up to the present, by the statistics for takeovers.
3 
This departure from the intuitive view of national financial systems can be partly explained by 
empirical biases. Cross-country studies tend to refer implicitly to the hypothesis of a nationally 
representative firm, a firm which corresponds observationally to listed companies. This hypothesis is 
insufficiently refined given that, in principle, the constraints on access to financial resources affect 
small to medium-sized enterprises more than large listed corporations and that financial globalisation 
encourages the trend towards homogeneity in the capital structures of the latter. More representative 
samples and comparative corporate financing studies focused on SMEs are likely to lead to a better 
assessment of the impact of financial constraints. 
                                                 
2   OECD financial statistics include a statement of sources of financing which allows for the evaluation of the flows coming 
from issuing shares (on the financial market and over the counter), an item which is not available in the balance sheet. But 
OECD national samples are more or less representative. Thus, in the OECD database, the sample of French companies 
comprises 800 firms, compared with 25 000 for Japan, but above all the sample is made up essentially of very large 
corporations, a fact which severely compromises its representativeness. 
3  In the 1990s international comparisons of corporate finance turned towards the issue of the control of company 




2.  EXPLANATIONS OF THE D ETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE TEND TO BE 
OVERSIMPLIFIED  
Within the determinants of capital structure, institutions and, to be more precise, regulations play an 
important role. However, explanations tend to be oversimplified. To illustrate this critical comment, 
German SMEs are a suitable example. Countries with legislation along German lines are a case in 
point. Small German manufacturing companies and their very small Austrian counterparts have a low 
level of net equity which makes them different not only from companies of the same nationality but 
also from companies in the other countries (Spain, France and Italy) selected in the study by the 
European Committee of Central Balance Sheet Offices (Delbreil et al., 1997). 
The high level of indebtedness of German SMEs confuses the ‘corporate finance view’, according to 
which capital structure may be related to an optimal choice, i.e. an equilibrium between the tax 
advantages of indebtedness and losses in the event of financial distress entailing the reorganisation of 
the firm. International comparisons admit that tax codes alone have very little explanatory power, so 
that distress costs deserve attention (Borio, 1990). Rajan and Zingales assume that financial distress 
costs increase when legislation favours bankruptcy and is thus not conducive to corporate 
reorganisation. They assume also that financial distress costs diminish with size, given that corporate 
reorganisation is less costly than bankruptcy and easier to implement in the case of large firms. 
Therefore leverage is expected to grow with size, particularly if the degree of legal protection of the 
lender is high. The German case is counter-intuitive from a ‘corporate finance view’. 
A network-type approach which embraces the ‘bank view’ may explain this puzzle. Indeed, the rate 
of indebtedness can be explained by the demand side and the supply side. Therefore the degree of 
protection which bankruptcy laws afford creditors may have a positive effect on the supply of credit. 
A high degree of protection for creditors, as provided notably by the speed with which companies in 
difficulty can be liquidated, this being the case for legislation based on the German model, 
encourages lenders to accept levels of debt which would be considered excessive in countries 
offering less protection. For example, bankruptcy laws focusing on the survival of companies in 
difficulty, as is the case in France, encourage lenders to demand higher levels of shareholders' equity 
(OECD, 1993). 
There it is no doubt that high levels of creditor protection constitute a negative incentive for corporate 
managers and owners. However, in the final analysis, the guarantees enjoyed by creditors of both 
small and medium-sized German firms seem to help more than hinder the recourse to debt. 
The problem posed by the effect of legislation on bankruptcy in Germany testifies to the limits of a 
unilateral approach focusing only on the credit demand side, as does the corporate finance view, 
which does not take bank behaviour adequately into account. The influence of regulatory controls on 
bankruptcy is not mechanical and cannot be defined unless the set incentive effects on lenders are 
taken into account. The impact of institutions cannot be explained by isolating regulatory controls 
from practice, and financial patterns are shaped by a complex set of determinants: bankruptcy 
regulations, the accounting and financing practices of each country, the relationships between banks 
and companies. 
Some research on the possible link between capital structure and the nature of firms' economic 




of financial distress correlates positively with the probability of bankruptcy and negatively with the 
probability of reorganisation, it may take different values according to the nature of the economic 
activity of the borrower. This approach has seen little development and is supported by very few 
observations (Harris and Raviv, pp. 315-319; Williamson, 1988; Titman, 1984; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). It confirms that one isolated determinant of capital structure has low explanatory 
power; reduction of explanatory variables to just one (in our example, the theoretical cost of financial 
distress) may compromise the correct understanding of actual capital structure. 
As a result, the German case testifies to the merits of : 
–  an approach which deals with the problems of coordination between non-financial and financial 
actors,  
–  a network-type approach towards the complex determinants of corporate finance, such an 
approach being only in its infancy. 
Delbreil et al. propose the use of a network model in which corporate financing strategies and 
structure are the outcome of interactions within legal and economic contexts that influence, in a 
distinct way, the sources of finance as well as the borrowing requirements. 
3.  FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY  
3.1.  The information asymmetry hypothesis, which embraces the difficulties encountered in 
assessing corporate quality and explains credit rationing, cannot be ignored. Our framework deals 
with the problems raised by asymmetry of information by taking into consideration information and 
knowledge shared by the actors. It is assumed that coordination is successful only if the managers, 
on the one hand, and the investors and lenders, on the other, have common points of reference for 
the evaluation of firms’ quality. 
In the case of large firms producing, for instance, mass-consumption products, common points of 
reference are numerous, even if the banks keep them at arm’s length and the investor’s information is 
limited. For such firm, capital structure is viewed in relation to standardised ratios and the actors may 
reach agreement at a relatively low cost in terms of coordination. 
In the case of certain firms - a small enterprise producing dedicated goods and using specialised 
assets being a very typical example - evaluation is a much harder task. Obtaining common points of 
reference requires more investigation on the part of the investor, so that the cost of coordination is 
relatively high, particularly at the beginning of the relationship. According to the ‘commitment view’ 
(Rivaud-Danset & Salais, 1992; Davis, 1996), long-term relationships between a bank and a 
company may reduce informational problems and thereby relax liquidity constraints for the borrower. 
This kind of relationship particularly suits such firms. 
Using a sample of French small and medium-sized firms, B. Paranque, D. Rivaud-Danset and R. 
Salais have conducted a principal component analysis in which the first correlation component relates 
to the nature of the physical assets (standard versus specific) and the second to the intended market 
for the products (generic versus dedicated). Distinct modes of performance correspond to the types 




"financing standard" towards which the companies in the sample converge seems to testify to the 
difficulties of lenders in evaluating companies' actual and qualitative characteristics. Assessment and, 
therefore, coordination difficulties could be higher for the smallest firms, as they are the most typified 
(Paranque et al., 1997). 
3.2.  The framework of this study forms part of the research agenda of convention-based 
economies, whose main aim is the coordination of actors in contexts characterised by uncertainty. 
Therefore, capital structure and requirements are better explained when dealing with the financing of 
a contingency, i.e. an unexpected event (the usual classification does not explain how a firm 
behaves in the case of a contingency). 
The impact of a contingency first affects current income and current assets; in the case of recovery, 
the firms’ financial requirements fundamentally stem from the growth of stock assets, while a 
decrease in GDP growth may entail a higher weight of trade debtors. Hence, the evaluation of 
financial requirements and performances of companies in the sample improves by taking into account 
‘capital employed’, an item which includes fixed assets and net non-financial current assets. 
The growth of non-financial current assets depends on the reserve financial current assets and/or the 
reserve borrowing power. These two types of reserves give financial flexibility to firms. Financial 
flexibility is useful in the case of a temporary variation of assets. Firms may lack financial flexibility 
because their cash balance and short-term borrowing capacity are low. A lack of the financial 
flexibility necessary to react to an unanticipated event (an exogeneous variation, such as an increase 
in trade debtors) is one of the possible factors in the bankruptcy of SMEs (ENSR, p. 181); at 
macroeconomic level, a lack of flexibility adversely influences the rate of accumulation and 
contributes to a deterioration in the situation. 
3.3.  The comparison of firms’ financial structures and performance according to country and size 
implies dealing with  diversity. As noted above, the canonical distinction for financial structure 
(market- versus bank-oriented) is not of sufficient relevance for empirical studies. The theoretical 
framework for this study is borrowed from Myers and Hicks. Following Myers and Hicks, we 
assume that balance-sheet structures may be viewed in relation to some ‘preferred patterns’. 
For Myers and Majluf, there is only one universal preferred pattern, which is commonly referred to 
as ‘the pecking order’ (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). External financial sources are 
second-best; to finance the growth of physical fixed assets, managers give priority to retained 
earnings (rate of retained earnings allows for the financing of expected investment), then to borrowing 
and, eventually, to issuing shares.
4 Econometric tests which take into account only investment in fixed 
assets are used as evidence of the ‘pecking order’, as investment correlates strongly with cash-flow 
capacity. 
Tests which embrace investment in current assets are infrequent. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
using a sample of major listed companies in thirty developed and developing countries, compare 
                                                 
4  The capital market, which tends to feel that managers issue shares in order to take advantage of share overvaluation, can 
ration the supply of capital, even for profitable projects. External investors implicitly demand a premium to purchase 
the shares of relatively high-quality firms, as they cannot distinguish good firms from lemons. This model, taken from 
Akerlof (Akerlof, 1970), supplements that of the rationing of credit by quantity (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As in the 




asset and liability structures, observing very similar patterns (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1996). Most firms in their sample used internal funds to finance fixed investment and externally raised 
funds, especially short-term debt, to finance short-term assets. As a result, it can be seen that the 
‘pecking order’ changes if current assets are taken into consideration. In spite of the predominance 
of internal resources to finance fixed assets, correlations within debt and current assets imply that 
differences in access to external financing may affect a firm's ability to exploit growth opportunities, 
as firms need to invest in both types of assets in order to grow.  
Hicks is one of the few economists who explicitly deal with the ways of financing unexpected events 
(Hicks, 1975). Two ‘preferred patterns’ are possible: 
–  in an autonomy sector, the firms hold reserve financial assets; 
–  in an overdraft sector, the firms do not hold enough liquid assets and borrow, mainly from the 
banks. 
Hicks emphasises the role of short-term credit as a means of financial flexibility. He suggests a 
methodological framework which sorts liabilities according to maturity, as does the balance sheet. He 
further suggests a framework for comparisons : in his essay, the two financing sectors are sustainable. 
Hicks admits that ‘a firm (which has no liquid assets) is not illiquid, if it has a substitute in the form of 
assured borrowing power, usually from a bank’ (1975, p. 50). An explicit or implicit reserve 
borrowing capacity may bring financial flexibility as does internal liquidity. 
For a certain type of firm (characterised by country, size, age, the nature of economic activity, the 
link with the parent company), the financial pattern and the degree of financial flexibility depend on 
the relationship between the firm and the banks, on the organisation of the financial system and on the 
financing practices of each country. The ‘preferred pattern’ is shaped to suit financial actors. Certain 
presumed advantages of banking systems cannot easily be observed. They have undoubtedly been 
overestimated, notably where the advantages of the relationship between universal banking 
institutions and large corporations are concerned.
5 However, it cannot be ruled out that certain 
advantages in the bank/company relationship may be of potential importance. For example, the 
bank/company relationship may provide the latter with an implicit or explicit guarantee of access to 
funds in order to cover unexpected financing needs. This safety net, which allows the company to 
reduce its cash in hand and, hence, its capitalisation, is characteristic of an "overdraft" regime, to use 
the term proposed by Hicks. Where this "bank safety net" is missing, firms seek a higher rate of own 
funds. 
To analyse firms’ performances, we follow the same framework. It is assumed that there is not one 
but several distinct models of profitability, each one characterised by positive and negative 
determinants of profitability. Each possible model of profitability may be as good as the next. This 
last point will be developed below. 
                                                 
5  Edwards and Fischer challenge the widely held view (Cable, 1985; Frankel et al., 1991) according to which the presence 
of financial institutions as shareholders in companies ensures that creditors are better informed, thus reducing agency 
costs and allowing for higher leverage. They note that the presence of such shareholders is reflected neither in greater 
leverage in the firms concerned nor in any particular capability for corporate reorganisation in the event of financial 




CONCLUSIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
It has been shown that it is difficult to verify the view that patterns of corporate finance and the 
restrictions limiting access to financial resources differ according to size and/or country and the view 
that corporate performance  can thus be affected. The consensus about the existence of such 
differences is gradually being undermined by the accumulation of empirical studies which often do not 
pay enough attention to the representativeness of the sample and the choice of indicators. 
We consider that the study of the specific nature of patterns of finance should not be limited to the 
financing of investment. The effect that capital structure may have on corporate dynamism shifts to 
take into account the availability of liquidity or the need for external liquidity to finance short-term 
variations in circulating (current) assets. Thus, the quality of evidence is improved by using a set of 
ratios including: 
–  advanced capital, which is a broader item than fixed assets; 
–  indicators of financial flexibility; 
–  different indicators of economic and financial performance. 
The survey of empirical studies shows that, in order to study financial structures and performances, it 
is necessary to use representative samples and comparable data. Although harmonisation of BACH 
data is not complete, BACH provides the information necessary to analyse the remaining differences 
(see Appendix II.1).  
The survey of empirical studies and theoretical literature suggests that financial structures and 
performances are better explained: 
–  in an approach based on a network of their complex determinants, 
–  in an approach dealing with the issue of uncertainty in a firm's day-to-day existence. 




CHAPTER II : DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF RATIOS FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 
IN EIGHT COUNTRIES SELECTED FROM THE BACH DATABASE (1990-96) 
The ratios analysed below cover the period 1990-96 and concern only the eight countries for which 
complete or nearly complete data are available, namely: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States are examined in separate 
sections. For each ratio, charts and graphs which are broken down by country and size show the 
mean value for the overall period. The ratios selected are presented in the boxes; a more accurate 
definition following the BACH scheme is shown in the appendix (p. XV). 
1.  DETERMINANTS OF GROSS PROFITABILITY  
In all the countries except Italy, the large firms show the lowest profitability (cf. Graph II.1). 
Economic differences are the main determinant here, although a sampling bias in favour of the most 
profitable small firms should not be excluded. 
Apart from consideration of size, overall gross profitability (gross profit over capital employed) is 
roughly comparable between countries, the exception being France, where it is substantially higher. 
Within the other seven countries, differences are not very substantial; they may be due not only to 
economic differences but also to a ccounting differences, as well as to differences in statistical 
treatment. 
The factors which favour profitability differentiate firms according to size in a relatively clear-cut 
manner. 
Box II.1 Return on capital employed or gross profitability 
The formation of profitability is based on a firm’s assets and efficiency and on the markets identified by it. These effects 
are reflected in cost structures. 
The self-financing it achieves over the medium to long term contributes to its financial resources. 
Profitability may be evaluated using a large set of indicators. Evidence is highly sensitive to the choice of indicators. In 
this study, overall gross profit over capital employed has been selected. It is the most basic ratio: 
– Gross profit is the margin after paying the cost of materials and consumables, plus operating charges and staff costs. It 
enables the firm to create the necessary provisions to meet its financial charges and to pay tax on its results; 
– The denominator is the capital employed or advanced, an item which takes into account all fixed assets, plus the 
working capital requirement and other non-financial and non-monetary current assets less other non-financial current 
liabilities. The working capital requirement is defined by operating assets (stocks and trade debtors) less operating 
liabilities (trade creditors and payments received on account of orders) (see also Box II.6). 
Thus the financing pattern does not influence gross profitability as it affects neither the numerator nor the denominator. 
The u se of other indicators of profitability would yield other evidence. For instance, margin rates 
such as mark-up or ‘gross operating profit ratio’ relate gross profit to either value added or turnover 
and so do not take into account the assets used to generate turnover. Financial profitability, i.e. the 
profitability of own funds, would introduce other determinants since it depends not only on economic 
performances but also on the level and cost of indebtedness. For reasons explained in Box II.1, 
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1.1.  What are the positive determinants of SME profitability ?  
Determinants which favour SME profitability can be divided into two groups:  
- greater efficiency in the use of the capital employed; 
- a higher degree of product transformation. 
 
1.1.1.  Greater efficiency in the use of the capital employed 
This evidence is borne out by the following ratios: 
•  a higher rate of value added over capital employed (cf. Graph II.2): value added per unit of 
capital is systematically higher in the case of small firms. This ratio decreases along with size in the 
eight countries, this being a marked trend in all the countries except Italy;  
Box II.2 Rate of value added over capital employed 
This ratio is germane to overall gross profitability. It thus strongly influences gross profitability. Efficiency in the use of 
labour and capital can be evaluated by applying the following criteria: 
– the apparent labour productivity (this ratio is not available, as BACH does not provide employment data); 
– the efficiency of fixed assets (value added over fixed assets); 
– the efficiency of capital employed relates value added to capital employed (the denominator takes into consideration 
almost the totality of assets, namely fixed and current non-financial and non-monetary assets, less trade and other non-
financial creditors). 
Substituting capital for labour has a positive effect on labour productivity and a rather negative effect on capital 
efficiency. The efficiency of fixed assets tends to decrease according to size (in two countries it is slightly higher for 
medium-sized enterprises). Differences between SEs and LEs can be dramatic, as in Germany and France. 
•  a lower rate of fixed assets over turnover (cf. Graph II.2): assets are here the numerator, so 
that a lower level indicates greater efficiency in their use (a lower level is required per unit of 




systematically higher in large firms. Small and medium-sized firms in France and Germany show 
an asset turnover rate that is nearly twice as low as that of large firms. 
The above ratios indicate indirectly that small and medium-sized firms are less capital-intensive than 
large ones. Thus efficiency in the use of fixed capital is greater. 
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1.1.2. Higher degree of product transformation 
This evidence is borne out by the following ratios: 
–  a higher rate of value added over turnover (cf. Graph II.3): the rate of value added per unit of 
turnover decreases with size; 
–  a lower rate of intermediate consumables over turnover (cf. Graph II.3): the proportion of 
intermediate consumables in turnover increases almost systematically with the size of the firm (see 
chart: costs of materials and consumables, in Appendix II). SMEs use less intermediate 
consumption in their manufacturing process than LEs. 
These ratios confirm the higher capacity of SMEs to create value added. 
Comparative handicaps of SMEs will be commented on below. Identifying the comparative 
advantages of profitability in large firms obviously leads to identification of the negative effects for 
SMEs. 
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1.2.  What are positive determinants of large firms’s profitability ?    
1.2.1.  The distribution of value added favours the profitability of large firms over smaller 
ones. This evidence is borne out by the following ratios:  
–  the mark-up ratio (cf. Graph II.4) increases with firm size for Belgium, France, Portugal and 
Japan and the same is observable in Italy from 1994 (it decreases for Austria as from 1992 and 
the mark-up ratio remains the same in Germany, regardless of firm size); 
Box II.3 
The mark-up ratio is defined as gross operating profit over value added. As defined by BACH, value added is divided 
between staff costs and gross operating profit, with the result that the mark-up ratio is equal to unity less staff costs 
over value added. 
It is interpreted as an expression of the power to negotiate prices in the market or with other firms. But it may also be 
simply the consequence of the cost structure. 
–  staff costs per unit of turnover is lower for LEs. 
The proportion of staff costs in turnover (cf. Graph II.4) systematically decreases with the size of the 
firm. The difference in the distribution of staff costs may result from: 
-  a lower level of wages for equal qualifications, but we assume that LEs offer better wages than 
SMEs, something which is commonly acknowledged; 
-  a higher level of labour productivity which can be related to a more capital-intensive orientation 
of large firms, since substituting capital for labour is the normal way of increasing labour 
productivity. 
The gap between LEs and SMEs has increased over the past six years. This growing difference in 
staff costs could also be explained by the higher propensity of LEs to use staff costs as an adjustment 
variable during periods of recession and therefore to maintain roughly the same level of labour 
productivity even in periods of recession (European Economy, No 7, July 1997, pp. 23-24). 
Box II.4 
Staff costs cover social charges, wages and salaries. Their level depends on the extent to which external labour is taken 
into account and on the existence of employee participation schemes. 
The share of staff costs in value added or in turnover correlates positively with the level of wages and 
negatively with the level of labour productivity. 
- cash-flow capacity 
The capacity to extract higher cash flow from equal turnover increases with size in every country 
except Spain (cf. Graph II.5). Thus, large firms have the highest self-financing capacity. This higher 
capacity can be explained by the higher mark-up ratio, but it may also be caused by higher gross 






Cash flow is calculated by summing gross operating profit and financial income less charges and by deducting the tax on 
profits. The cash-flow capacity (cash flow per unit of turnover) enables the firm to create the provisions for depreciation 
on fixed assets. It will also be the source either of shareholder remuneration (dividends) or of self-financing through 
allocations to reserves. Clearly, cash-flow capacity influences a firm’s investment potential since it is the source of 
internal finance. 
In this study we assume that the productivity of labour is higher in large firms, as a consequence of 
their higher capital intensity; this is a commonly accepted hypothesis since this ratio cannot be 
evaluated. The BACH database does not give the number of employees, but value added over 
staff costs may be used as a proxy for labour productivity. This ratio increases with size in seven 
countries, the tendency being particularly strong in Portugal. 
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1.2.2.  Another element benefiting large firms: the working capital requirement 
Box II.6 
The working capital requirement over turnover measures the weight of short-term non-financial assets, these being 
stocks and trade debtors. Trade creditors must be deducted as they are a source of financing strongly correlated with trade 
debtors. Both are ‘non-financial’ items as they do not bear interest. Their levels depend on national and sectoral habits. 
The weight of these assets results from the firm’s network of upstream-downstream relationships, i.e. the nature of its 
commercial relationships with suppliers and customers. 
In most of the European countries selected, small and medium-sized firms showed a higher working 
capital requirement (cf. Graph II.6). The study of the major components of working capital shows 
some interesting regularities which will be explained below to support this observation. 
 











AUSTRIA BELGIUM FRANCE GERMANY ITALY PORTUGAL SPAIN JAPAN
SEs MEs LEs  
 
The ratio of stock to turnover, which is expressed as a number of days, when multiplied by 360, 
identifies firms according to size (cf. Graph II.6). In the European countries, its mean value varies 
within a rather narrow range from 45 days in Spain to 60 days in Portugal (all sizes included, in 
1994, which is the last year when data was available for Germany). Nevertheless, this ratio remains 
higher in any European country than in Japan, where it is only 38 days for all sizes, a figure which 
testifies to Japanese business organisation, which aims to reduce stocks to a few days. The stock 
ratio d ecreases with size in the European countries covered by our study, apart from France. 
Differences according to size may be dramatic; in 1995, for instance, the difference between large 
and small Spanish firms was 20 days. 
The fact that large firms have fewer days of stocks than smaller firms may be partly due to the 
growing tendency of large firms to subcontract stock management to small and medium-sized firms.  
The rate of trade debtors over turnover displays a common feature in European countries, with large 
firms showing the lowest rate in any country expect Japan.  
The trade creditors ratio is roughly comparable from one size to the next in five countries. The 




lowest level of trade debtors. Hence, smaller French firms supply liquidity to the larger ones through 
non-interest-bearing trade credit. 
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To sum up, the difference in the working capital requirement ratio may signify some power on the 
part of the large firms to manage short-term assets, along with the flexibility of SMEs. In the 
European countries, large firms manage stocks in such a way that they cover fewer days than in the 
case of smaller firms. They also benefit from trade credit since they are in a better negotiating 
position than smaller firms, regardless of other factors which influence trade credit (as is commonly 
accepted, the levels of trade creditors and debtors are much lower in Germany than in Italy). It 
suggests also that in the European countries SME flexibility, i.e. the capacity to react to unexpected 




SUMMARY AND PREMIMINARY CONCLUSIONS  
This descriptive analysis shows that the ratios which have either a negative or a positive influence on 
profitability distinguish between firms according to size in a relatively clear-cut manner which 
transcends nationality (see Chart II.7). This evidence supports the idea that there are different 
patterns of profitability formation. 
In small firms, profitability management is less ‘sophisticated’.
6 Hence, it may be that some of the 
negative effects on large firms are exaggerated by the data. External growth through the acquisition of 
holdings makes it possible to centralise profit formed elsewhere and to locate it in a country selected 
for its tax advantages. The study of the determinants of profitability has shown that the efficiency of 
fixed assets is lower in large firms. It indicates indirectly the greater capital intensity of LEs, a 
handicap for profitability which is partly offset by the lower share of staff costs. But the weight of 
fixed assets and its negative effect on large firms’ profitability cannot be reduced to tangible assets. 
To make this point clearer, it is necessary to take the financial component into consideration. The 
weight of financial fixed assets, which include shares and long-term loans in affiliated undertakings, 
arises from managing external growth. In all the countries selected, the proportion of financial fixed 
assets in the total amount of fixed assets increases with size (cf. Graph II.8). The proportion is 
particularly high for large firms in Belgium, France and Germany. The fixed assets over turnover ratio 
would be higher if financial assets were excluded from the denominator, and the gap between SMEs 
and LEs would be lessened. 
 
Chart II.7 Indicator and determinants of profitability 
  Large enterprises  Small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
Gross profit / capital employed  -    +   
Value added / capital employed  -  H  +  A 
Value added / turnover  -  H  +  A 
Fixed assets / turnover   +  H  -  A 
Costs of consumables / turnover  +  H  -  A 
Mark-up  +  A  -  H 
Staff costs / turnover  -  A  +  H 
Working capital requirement / turnover  -  A  +  H 
Cash-flow capacity  +  A  -  H 
- :  lesser value    A :  profitability advantage 
+ :  higher value     H :  profitability handicap 
 
Comparative advantages in favour of SMEs come from a higher rate of value added over fixed 
assets and a higher degree of product transformation. Both of these advantages can be related to 
greater labour intensity. 
Hence, there are factors influencing profitability that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
lower capital intensity, which is a feature of SMEs, promotes their profitability. On the other, by 
                                                 
6  For instance, the weight of  other non-financial current assets less other non-financial current liabilities is lower in SMEs 




reducing economies of scale and labour productivity, it can have a negative impact on profitability, at 
least on a static view. 
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This interpretation suggests that an SME is not a large firm operating on a smaller scale and that 
SMEs and LEs may follow distinct patterns of profitability. This hypothesis is tested in the fourth 
chapter of this study. 
Some observations indicate that differences are amplified by the relationships between large and 
small firms. Thus, the lower weight of staff costs (and the higher mark-up ratio) for LEs could be 
related to the use of subcontracting to SMEs. It is supposed that large firms can also subcontract 
stock management and benefit from trade credit; these advantages are reflected in the working 
capital requirement ratio. The network of business relationships would accentuate SMEs’ 
comparative advantages (higher capacity to create value added) and handicaps (higher working 
capital requirement).  
These observations obviously influence financial needs. SMEs’ operating cycle (or business cycle) 
requires more financial resources per unit of turnover. 
To conclude, SME financing: 
–  must not be related to lower performances (observations are highly sensitive to the ratio of 
profitability, and the ratio selected in this study indicates higher performances); in spite of a lower 
cash-flow capacity (i.e. capacity to create internal sources of finance per unit of turnover), SMEs 
need a lower level of capital employed per unit of turnover; 
–  must be related to the rate of investment in fixed assets; 
–  cannot ignore the higher working capital requirement of SMEs, a characteristic which can be 




2.  FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND CAPITAL  
As we now turn our attention to financial structure, structural differences among small, medium-sized 
and large firms are no longer clearly discernible. Specific national features of financial systems affect 
firms’ behaviour, so that regularities in size are more difficult to observe. 
Three matters will be examined in this subsection: 
–  own funds, leverage and provisions, i.e. stable resources; 
–  short-term capital and liquidity requirement; 
–  financial charges. 
2.1.  Own funds, leverage and provisions  
The ratio ‘financial debt over balance-sheet total’ relates all the debts that bear financial charges 
to the balance sheet (Box II.8 and Graph II.9). It decreases with size in four countries: Austria, 
Germany, Portugal and Japan. The large gap between SMEs and LEs is a peculiarity of the 
Germanic countries, already examined in the first chapter of this study. Differences according to size 
are small in France, Italy and Spain. Belgium stands out in that large firms there tend to be slightly 
more indebted than SMEs. 
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Components of financial indebtedness are mainly debenture loans, amounts owed to credit institutions and intra-group 
loans. Trade credit is not included as it does not generate financial charges. However, this is not the case in Germany, 
where trade credit is not always shown separately from financial credit. 
It is difficult to interpret the differences in level between the countries because we cannot always distinguish whether they 
stem from accounting and statistical rules or from national lending relationships. 
Analysis of the ratio ‘own funds over balance-sheet total’ will support these observations (Graph 
II.9). SMEs are far less capitalised than large companies in the four above-mentioned countries. In 
the other four, differences according to size are not significant. 
 
Graph II.10 : Reserves / capital and reserves 
























The ratio ‘reserves over capital and reserves’ estimates the proportion of reserves in own funds 
(Graph II.10). Reserves are one source of own funds, the other one being external funds, which may 
come either from associates or from financial markets. It is commonly assumed that large firms can 
issue shares more easily than smaller ones, so that the proportion of reserves in own funds can be 




The ratio referred to as ‘leverage’ in this study relates long-term financial debt to overall stable 
capital, i.e. long-term financial debt plus own funds and provisions (Graph II.10). In the four 
countries mentioned above, small firms are more leveraged than larger firms, possibly offsetting their 
lower capitalisation. The situation in France is different in that SMEs there have slightly lower 
capitalisation and lower leverage and, hence, less stable capital than LEs. This ratio provides 
confirmation that size does not have a significant impact on the capital structure of Italian firms. 
The ratio ‘provisions over own funds’ (Graph II.11) shows that country has a powerful impact on 
financial structure while size has only a small impact. It is structurally very high in Austria and 
Germany notably because of the pension provisions that are managed by firms for their employees. 
These provisions should be considered virtually as ‘own funds’. This item includes other types of 
provisions the size of which reflects accounting conventions and tax incentives. 
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2.2.  Short-term capital and liquidity  
The ratio ‘short-term financial debt over turnover’ (Graph II.12) relates short-term financial debt 
(mainly from banks but also from the parent company) to turnover. Per unit of turnover, more short-
term financial debt is required by SMEs in most of the selected countries. This observation can be 
associated with their financial debt structure and their higher working capital requirement. 
‘Financial debt structure’ measures short-term financial debt as a proportion of overall financial 
debt.
7 In the countries of southern Europe, SMEs display a slightly higher rate of short-term financial 
debt while in all European countries medium-sized companies share the same feature. Japan is the 
only country in the sample where small enterprises have less recourse to short-term debt than large 
ones. This point will be discussed in the fifth chapter of this report. 
The ratio ‘cover rate of capital employed’ is related to operating funds since it indicates the degree 
to which a firm’s long-term or stable funds (own funds, long-term debt and provisions) cover fixed 
                                                 
7  Short-term debt includes long-term loans falling due within one year, but this is not the case for French firms since this 




assets, the working capital requirement and other non-financial current assets (Graph II.13). The 
cover rate of capital employed increases with size in Austria, Germany, Portugal and Japan. It 
decreases in Belgium and France, where small firms have proportionately higher amounts of 
operating funds. There is no discernible size-related difference in Italy or Spain. 
This ratio sums up two partly independent factors. The numerator, long-term financing, may grow 
with size in most of the selected countries as its components are the following items: capital and 
reserves, provisions and long-term financial loans. The denominator, capital employed, is relatively 
higher for large firms. In Italy and Spain the effects of these two factors cancel each other out; in 
France and Belgium SMEs take advantage of their lower capital employed per unit of turnover; in 
the other countries large firms take advantage of their higher proportion of long-term capital. 
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Box II.9 Liquid capital requirement 
The liquid capital requirement depends on the way a firm covers the capital employed, which can be financed only by 
long-term or stable funds (own funds, long-term financial debt and provisions). In such a case, the liquid capital 
requirement is negative and, as a consequence, the current financial and monetary assets exceed short-term financial debt. 
In other words, the cash balance is positive and any growth of assets can initially be covered by current investment and 
cash. Such a case describes an ‘autonomy sector’, using Hicks’ classification, to which this report has referred. 
However, current investments might be considered not as reserves but as any investment generating profit. This behaviour 
was observed in the first part of this decade, when the interest rate on short-term investment was exceptionally attractive. 
If the stable financial resources do not cover the total amount of capital employed, the gap is financed by short-term 
financial indebtedness, the cash balance being negative and the liquid capital requirement positive. In other words, the 
liquid capital requirement is positive when operating funds (i.e. stable funds less fixed assets) do not cover the total 
amount of non-financial current assets less non-financial current liabilities. 
Obviously, in this second case, which typifies an ‘overdraft sector’, the banking relationship is important for business 
flexibility. 
The ratio ‘liquid capital requirement over turnover’ complements the previous one (Box II.9 and 
Graph II.13). Liquidity requirements, which stem from a lack of operating funds, decrease with firm 
size in Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Japan because long-term fund cover tends to be better 




relative to size. Generally speaking, whatever their size, firms in Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain display a positive liquid capital requirement since their long-term funds do not cover total 
capital employed. For the other three countries, the cover is close to or above unity. Of course, a 
symmetrical result would be obtained by looking at the ‘cash balance’, which represents current 
investments and cash at bank and in hand less short-term loans owed to credit institutions and to 
other financial creditors. 
2.3.  Financial charges and risk  
It is well known that the smallest firms carry a risk premium which is usually  - and rather 
superficially- explained by their higher failure rate. With BACH data, it is possible to estimate the risk 
premium as the difference in the apparent interest rate according to size for the following countries: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan.
8 Risk premiums are roughly constant, except in 
Italy, where they decrease during the period under review. They are not high for medium-sized firms, 
ranging from 0 to 1 percentage point, but are substantial for small firms. Compared with large firms, 
small firms carry a risk premium that is 2 to 3 percentage points higher in all the above-mentioned 
European countries except Germany (because of an accounting peculiarity, this last result may be 
misleading). The situation in Japan is rather different as the risk premium is almost as high for 
medium-sized firms as for smaller ones. 
3.  COMMENTS ON THE UNITED STATES  
The US data is not mentioned in the comparisons above and are analysed separately for three 
reasons. Firstly, the United States, like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, provide data from 
consolidated accounts. The eight countries selected provide data from individual accounts only. 
Secondly, since harmonisation has so far been focused on the European countries, the comparability 
of the US data is limited and some important items are not available. Thirdly, there are only two size 
classes and ‘SMEs’ cover mostly medium-sized firms. 
Only two determinants of profitability can be evaluated. In the United States, SMEs have the same 
comparative advantage as in the European countries. The rate of fixed assets per unit of turnover is 
far higher in SMEs than in LEs. However, the working capital requirement is similar in SMEs and 
LEs (a higher proportion of stock is offset by a higher proportion of trade creditors). Thus, per unit 
of turnover, SMEs need less capital employed.
9 
 
                                                 
8  The available data are only averages. This reduces their informative value since marginal interest rates cannot be 
ascertained. 
9  Yet, comparisons with European firms are dubious as the item ‘payment received on account from customer’ is not 


















The financial structure is influenced by these features. The cover rate of capital employed (i.e. stable 
capital over capital employed) is higher for SMEs and the liquid capital requirement is negative. To 
sum up, the available determinants of profitability and the indicators of capital requirement suggest 
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Some indicators of the capital structure also show that size distinguishes between firms in a clear-cut 
manner. First, the level of own funds is slightly higher for SMEs, a feature which is not observed in 
the selected European countries. Of course, this observation merits attention but, using the BACH 
database (like any balance-sheet data), it is not possible to distinguish between the sources of own 
funds (cash flow, shares issued privately or on the financial markets). Yet, this feature can be related 
to a second one, the level of provisions, which is quite low for SMEs but important for LEs (from 
1992 to 1996, the ratio ‘provisions over capital and reserves’ fluctuated between 40% and 50%). 




(this may be due to consolidated accounts). Finally, the proportion of short-term debt, which is very 
low in LEs, is a significant figure in the case of SMEs,
10 a feature which is also observed in the 
European countries. This last result suggests that the banking relationships might be more important 
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To sum up, the US data confirms the following. SMEs are less capital-intensive and more reliant on 
short-term financial debt than larger firms. 
CONCLUSIONS  
If we look at the determinants of profitability, structural differences appear among small, medium-
sized and, above all, large firms that transcend their nationality. Two ratios which are germane to 
gross profitability sum up the advantages of small and medium-sized firms compared with large firms: 
their capital employed over turnover rate is higher, as is the value added per unit of capital employed. 
Comparative advantages in favour of SMEs come from a higher rate of value added over fixed 
assets and a higher degree of product transformation. Both of these advantages can be associated 
with greater labour intensity. 
If we turn our attention to financial structures, the picture is less clear and regularities that transcend 
nationality are far from being so evident. Some widespread ideas about SMEs' financial handicaps 
are neither confirmed nor denied. This study suggests a new way of coming to terms with such ideas.  
It is often said that, compared with larger firms, SMEs are much more dependent on internal sources 
of funds (owner’s own capital and retained profits) than on external sources of finance (financial 
markets and indebtedness). This handicap is not easy to demonstrate since one cannot tell which part 
of subscribed capital comes from the owner and which part from financial markets. Leaving this 
aside, leverage (i.e. long-term financial debt) is higher for SMEs than for LEs in four of the eight 
                                                 




selected countries (Austria, Germany, Portugal and Japan) while own funds have a smaller weighting. 
As a whole, SMEs do not seem to be more dependent on internal sources than larger firms since 
long-term debt can offset a lower rate of financial market funds. 
It is commonly acknowledged that SMEs suffer from a lack of own funds. This study aims to 
challenge not the statistical observation but the usual interpretation given, as exemplified by the 
expression ‘suffer from a lack of’. Using the BACH database, a gap can be accurately observed 
between SMEs and LEs in four countries, while no marked differences according to size are 
displayed in four others. Meanwhile, in the United States, SMEs are more highly capitalised than LEs 
(see Chart II.17). By qualifying this gap as ‘a lack’, economists wish to highlight the importance of 
own funds. The undercapitalisation of SMEs can restrict asset growth. It is also a key measure of 
solvency which indicates an enterprise's financial solidity to investors. However, ‘own funds’ is a 
key factor which cannot be viewed in isolation as the following comments suggest. Own funds are an 
internal resource for funding investments and provide a signal which helps to increase external 
resources. The question of the adequate level of own funds cannot be discussed per se, without 
taking into consideration, firstly, the growth strategy of each individual firm and, secondly, the various 
sources of finance for each firm. 
 
Chart II.17 Financial structure and capital requirement of SMEs (versus LEs) 
  Number of countries 
  +  -  = 
Own funds  2*  4  3 
Financial debt / balance sheet   4  1  3 
Reserves / capital and reserves  4  2  2 
Leverage  4  3  1 
Short-term financial debt /turnover  7*  1  1 
Cover rate of capital employed  3*  4  2 
Liquid capital requirement  5  4*  0 
Financial debt structure  5  1  2 
* Including the United States. 
 
A firm that relies too much on debt can suffer from an excess of financial charges that would 
jeopardise its future development. In contrast, a firm that relies too much on own funds may miss 
some opportunities to increase its assets because such an increase would have implied debt. Such a 
firm will certainly send good signals of sound finance to investors but these signals would be of little 
value if the managers planned to rely only on internal resources to fund asset growth. For such a firm, 
a high level of own funds may correlate with a low-investment strategy which can be detrimental to 
future competitiveness. 
It is usually accepted that a low level of capitalisation testifies to the difficulties of SMEs in issuing 
shares on capital markets, so that their choices are reduced in comparison with LEs. Yet, in some 
cases, e.g. small firms in Austria and Germany, another interpretation fits better. Here, what may 
appear as a low level of capitalisation may also be seen as the result of managers’ preference for 
other funds. As a matter of fact, the high leverage of small Austrian and German firms testifies to the 




Finally, the main evidence of this descriptive analysis is summarised below. 
The analysis of the determinants of profitability shows that SMEs enjoy comparative advantages. 
Both the efficiency of fixed assets and the degree of product transformation are higher than in the 
case of LEs. With their greater labour intensity, staff costs per unit of value added are higher and thus 
the mark-up is lower. An additional feature of SMEs is the higher rate of stock and trade credit per 
unit of turnover, this being partly a result of inter-business relationships, which in most countries 
favour large firms. 
Observed capital structure does not lend itself to any straightforward interpretation because of the 
complexity of the determinants, including specific national features of financing systems. The 
composition of stable finance is highly sensitive to country. Nevertheless, some regularities are 
observed. In four countries, the same main features can be observed. SMEs are less highly 
capitalised but more highly leveraged (‘leverage’ in this study takes into consideration only long-term 
financial loans). Thus, the lack of stable funds due to the lack of own funds tends to be offset by 
long-term indebtedness. Therefore, SMEs display a far lower rate of stable capital over capital 
employed in only two of the four countries, Austria and Germany. 
On the whole, SMEs tend to rely more on short-term (as opposed to long-term) financial debt than 
larger firms, while SMEs require more short-term financial debt per unit of turnover in most 
countries. This tendency may correlate with their higher working capital requirement and higher 
flexibility. 
The ratios examined in this descriptive part of the study call for a focus not only on SMEs’ handicaps 




CHAPTER III : EVIDENCE FROM PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS  
For a better understanding of the financial pattern and its assumed impact on the performances of 
firm, data analysis (i.e. principal component analysis) is used as a way of displaying a framework 
which embraces the financial structure and the most common indicators of profitability. Indeed, in 
order to test the view that the financial pattern: 
–  is better described by using a set of financial indicators so as to take into account the financing of 
flexibility (Chapter I),  
–  may differ not only according to country but also according to size and perhaps sector, and  
–  may be linked to a complex set of other ‘real’ variables, mainly profitability,  
two statistical methods are suitable: principal component analysis (PCA) and cluster analysis (CA). 
Since a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 20 variables have been selected to highlight the capital 
structure of SMEs and large firms, it is impossible to plot all these variables simultaneously. Principal 
component analysis can be used to summarise the data in two or three dimensions and helps to 
visualise the data (Box III.1). 
Box III.1 
Principal component analysis (PCA) begins by calculating the correlation among corporate BACH data, broken down 
by size (3 sizes), sector (3), country (8) and year (6 or 7). It allows the number of selected variables - called ‘active 
variables’ – to be reduced to a few independent and hence orthogonal components (or factors). Principal components are 
plotted to illustrate that they represent orthogonal rotations of the original variables. 
PCA is used mainly to sort individual data. However, the  corporate data available from BACH is group data and not 
microdata, i.e. there is only one average figure for each size/sector category and balance-sheet item. Hence it is implicitly 
assumed that all enterprises in one category behave like the average within a given category. In other words, the average 
firm is assumed to be a representative one. Our sample contains 486 observations or ‘average firms’ which are grouped 
into clusters. 
We then turn to cluster analysis, which sorts the output data set according to each of the large components and permits 
the grouping of data that is most similar (a standard iterated algorithm is used to minimize the sum of squared distances 
from the cluster means). The observations are divided into clusters so that every observation belongs to only one cluster. 
The number of clusters is chosen according to frequency so that the number of observations in each cluster is not too 
small. Principal components are plotted to illustrate how original observations are spread out. The most ‘representative’ 
firms of the sample (firms of the BACH data sample broken down by size, sector, country and year) are located near the 
intersection of the principal components. 
1.  EVIDENCE FROM PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS  
Variables have been selected following a theoretical approach which takes into account the financing 
of contingencies.  
Active variables are mostly indicators of the financial pattern. They have been selected on the basis 
that:  
–  the impact of contingencies first affects current assets, so that financial debt has been broken 




–  the accumulation of capital must be widened and must include circulating or short-term 
non-financial assets, instead of focusing only on fixed assets.  
Therefore, the ways of financing the operating cycle deserve special attention. Theoretical literature 
did not pay much attention to this topic. As explained in Chapter I, this research follows Hicks’ idea 
of two financing sectors (one called ‘autonomy’ and the other called ‘overdraft’) which differ when it 
comes to obtaining liquidity should an unexpected opportunity result in a need for additional capital: 
(i)  in an autonomy sector, the firm holds reserve financial assets (cash at bank and in hand, as 
well as liquid securities or current investment) as a counterpart to the high coverage of assets by 
long-term debt, provisions and stockholders’ equity;  
(ii)  in an overdraft sector, the firm does not hold enough reserve financial assets (or internal 
liquidity) and borrows, mainly from banks.  
As this research also focuses on the standard structure of capital, i.e. on the usual distinction between 
instruments of ownership and debt securities, active variables have been selected so that firms can be 
distinguished: 
–  according to the way of financing total employed capital, the distinction being between firms with 
a high level of own funds (equity and ‘own funds’ are equivalent in this report) and those with a 
high level of long-term financial indebtedness (debt in excess of one year); 
–  according to the way of financing the operating cycle, with the previous distinction between those 
which hold net reserve financial assets (i.e. cash at bank and in hand, as well as current 
investments net of financial short-term debt) as a counterpart to a high coverage rate of capital 
employed and those with net short-term financial debts. 
Selected ‘active variables’ which are listed in Box III.2 and in Appendix III also include cash-flow 
capacity as the major determinant of internal financial resources and the ‘leverage impact’, which 
measures the impact of debt on financial profitability. 
In this research, the number of active variables is limited to 8. Thus, other ratios which are indicators 
or determinants of profitability or items which may help describe the corporate capital structure are 
treated as ‘supplementary variables’. It means that their coordinates on components are calculated 
but they contribute neither to the definition of components nor to the grouping of data. The 
supplementary variables are divided into two groups, as indicated in Box III.2 and in Appendix III. 
The PCA covers the period 1989-95 and concerns, firstly, the eight countries for which complete or 
nearly complete data is available and, secondly, four other countries for which more data is missing. 





Box III.2 Selected variables of the principal component analysis 
ACTIVE VARIABLES 
Indicators of financial structures: 
•  own funds / total = capital and reserves / balance-sheet total 
•  leverage = provisions and medium- and long-term liabilities / (provisions and medium- and long-term liabilities + capital 
and reserves)  
•  reserves rate = reserves / capital and reserves 
•  short term fin. debt /*= short-term financial debt/total financial debt 
•  cover rate of K emp. = (capital and reserves + medium- and long-term debt) / (fixed assets + working capital 
requirement)  
•  liquid capital requirement = [(fixed assets + working capital requirement) – (provisions and medium- and long-term 
liabilities + capital and reserves)] / turnover  
 
Indicator of profitability and of internal financial resources: 
cash flow capacity = cash flow/ turnover 
Indicator of leverage impact: 
•  leverage impact = ‘financial profitability less gross profitability’ = (cash flow / capital and reserves) - (gross operating 




Indicators and determinants of profitability: 
•  gross profitability = gross operating profit / capital employed  
•  profit / own funds = profit or loss on ordinary activities after taxes / capital and reserves  
•  mark-up ratio  
•  fixed assets / t.o. = fixed assets / turnover  
•  working cap. require. = working capital requirement / turnover  
•  fin. charges / t.o. = financial charges over turnover  
 
Financial structure and capital requirement: 
•  provisions/own funds 
•  solvency = cash flow/financial debt 
•  trade creditors / t.o.= trade creditors over turnover  
•  current assets /st d = current assets over short-term non-financial debt 
•  sh fin. debt /t.o. = short-term financial debt over turnover  
•  wcr + current invest&c = working capital requirement + current investments and cash 
•  over short-term financial loans 
 
* In the PCA, short-term financial debt is related to total financial debt; it is similar to the ‘financial debt structure’ ratio in 




Graph III.1 First plot: active variables and components 1 and 2 
 
Three components provide a good summary of the data as they explain 84% of the total variance 
(Appendix III). Graph III.1 is obtained by projecting the first two components, which are always 
orthogonal (see Box III.1). 
The first component accounts for 48.6% of the total variance and the second for 19.7%. The main 
variables correlated with the first component are the cover rate of capital employed, the rate of own 
funds and the rate of reserves (positively), the leverage impact, leverage and (the rate of) short-term 
financial debt (negatively) (Appendix III). The coordinates of the first component seem to suggest 
that firms with a high level of equity and liquid assets would contrast with firms with high leverage and 
few liquid assets. Yet, the study of the second component shows that this view is oversimplified. The 
second component depicts a contrast between the rate of own funds, the debt structure and the 
liquid capital requirement (with a positive correlation), on the one hand, and leverage (with a negative 
correlation), on the other. ‘Liquid capital requirement’ is, by definition, the opposite of ‘cover rate of 
capital employed’ and, not surprisingly, strongly correlated with ‘short-term financial debt’, which 
indicates the composition of financial debt. In contrast, ‘liquid capital requirement’ is not linked to 
‘leverage’, which in this study takes into account only long-term liabilities. It indicates that a firm may 
finance its need for stable funds through own funds and its need for short-term funds by borrowing 
from the bank or from partners. Conversely, the ‘overdraft sector’ does not entail a high ‘leverage’. 
It indicates that a firm may be characterised by a high level of long-term indebtedness and, 
consequently, a low level of own funds, whereas its level of financial current assets may be relatively 




To sum up, the most striking feature of the plot of the first and second principal components is the 
independence of the following two pairs of variables: 
–  cover rate of capital employed versus liquid capital requirement, 
–  own funds versus leverage. 
The plot of the first and the third components (component 3 accounts for 15.6% of the total 
variance) shows an interesting feature (Graph III.2). The third component is defined by a negative 
correlation with cash-flow capacity and a rather low positive correlation with the rate of short-term 
financial debt (Appendix III). None of the indicators of the financial pattern is strongly correlated 
with cash-flow capacity, which is the explanatory variable of internal financial resources. For 
instance, we do not observe a strong link between cash-flow capacity and a high rate of own funds 
or, to be more accurate, we do not observe that the firms with the highest cash-flow capacity show 
the highest rate of own funds. Correlation between ‘cash-flow capacity’ and rate of ‘own funds’ is 
equal to 0.47. Between ‘cash flow’ and ‘rate of reserves’ (which indicates the structure of own 
funds) correlation approximates to zero. 
 





Graph III.3 Supplementary variables and components 1 and 2 
 
Key 
leverage = active variable 
gross profitability = supplementary variable 
 
This result is borne out by taking into account among the supplementary variables those which 
indicate profitability and are calculated from the profit and loss account. They are plotted on the first 
plot (components 1 and 2) to illustrate how indicators of profitability correlate with indicators of 
financial pattern (Graph III.3). Graph III.3 shows the following interesting features. 
Firstly, gross profitability (i.e. return on capital employed, as defined in Chapter II) is located not far 
from the barycentre (the intersection of the two first components) and does not correlate with any 
financial pattern. This suggests that the firms in the BACH database have distinct modes of financing 
which are sustainable. Although the absence of any link between the level of profitability and the level 
of own funds is not surprising,
11 it may be necessary to make this point clear. Higher profitability is 
not linked to a higher rate of own funds because the best-performing firms are usually those which 
have the highest rate of accumulation; this implies that, in spite of their capacity for generating internal 
                                                 
11   The same evidence is produced by a study using individual data from a large sample of French firms (Rivaud-Danset et 




resources, they need external funds which come mainly from borrowing, since t he issuing of 
additional shares is normally a very minor source of funds. This evidence also indicates that a higher 
level of own funds does not automatically entail better performances. More facilities for issuing 
shares on financial markets may be used, for instance, to reduce a firm's indebtedness; in such a 
case, gross profitability remains unchanged. 
Secondly, financial profitability (i.e. profitability of own funds), the most synthetic indicator from a 
financial point of view and the most important for shareholders, is located near the barycentre; this 
means that there is no discrimination between classes of the cluster analysis, i.e. groups of firms 
aggregated according to their financial pattern.  
Thirdly, higher leverage (i.e. long-term financial debt) does not correlate with lower profitability - as 
a consequence of the first point - but correlates with the leverage impact. This variable measures the 
impact of leverage on the profitability of own funds. The most highly leveraged firms in the BACH 
database take advantage of their recourse to debt; long-term indebtedness favours the growth of 
turnover so that it exceeds the growth of financial charges, the difference between the selected 
indicators being positive.  
Fourthly, the two ratios of profitability, gross or financial profitability, are located in the southern 
quadrants and are not correlated with ‘mark-up’ and ‘cash-flow capacity’, which are located in the 
north-east quadrant. In the first set, ratios are indicators of efficiency. In the second set, they are 
indicators of margin; mark-up indicates the distribution of value added (a higher mark-up, by 
definition, correlates with a lower rate of staff costs) and influences cash-flow capacity. The distance 
between these two set of ratios indicates that most of the firms in the sample do not combine a higher 
efficiency of capital employed and a higher mark-up. It confirms one result of the previous 
descriptive analysis: indicators of margin favour LEs whereas indicators of efficiency favour SMEs. 
Fifthly, gross profitability correlates with the reserve rate and cover rate of capital employed; in other 
words, firms with a high level of profitability are in a better position as regards own reserves and, of 
course, stable financial resources. To some extent, this evidence would corroborate the ‘pecking 
order’ (Chapter I); higher profitability makes it possible to limit the use of external financial 
resources, whatever they are.  
To sum up, Graphs III.1, III.2 and III.3 support the following: 
–  the absence of any link between the margin or profitability level and the financial structure, and 
–  the view that a given level of profitability can be reached using distinct patterns or models, namely 
higher efficiency of capital employed or lower unit wage cost.  
Some other supplementary indicators of financial structures and capital requirement, when projected 
on the first plot (Graph III.4), show correlations with active variables:  
–  a high rate of short-term financial debt over turnover correlates with higher use of short-term 
financial debt, as expected;  
–  solvency correlates with own funds, as expected, because the solvency ratio relates cash-flow 
capacity to long-term financial loans, with the result that this ratio is high when long-term 




–  a high rate of provisioning correlates with leverage; this unexpected result is explained by the 
cluster analysis. 
 
Graph III.4 Other supplementary variables and components 1 and 2 
 
Key 
leverage = active variable 
solvency = supplementary variable 
 
2.  EVIDENCE FROM THE CLUSTER  
Cluster analysis groups together similar data. It uses the coordinates on components given by 
PCA and allows the linking of the most similar firms and their grouping into quite homogeneous 
classes according to their financial structure. Graph III.5 is obtained by projection of the first 
two components and cluster analysis suggests a division of the sample firms into four clusters along 





Graph III.5 Active data and components 1 and 2 
 
Key: 
198923AUT1=   the small (1) Austrian average firm observed in 1989 producing non-durable consumption goods 
(sector 23) 
l  =   Austria (AUT)      1   = small firm   
n  =  Belgium (BEL)      2   = medium-sized firm 
￿  =   France (FR)              3   = large firm 
t  =   Germany (GER) 
u  =  Japan (JAP  1  = intermediate products 
￿  =   Italy (ITA)           22  = investment goods and consumer durables 
¡  =   Portugal (POR)        23  = consumption goods 
s  =   Spain (ESP) 
 
Symbol size is related to the contribution of the observation to the definition of the components. 
 
It is not surprising to find that ‘country’ has an overwhelming effect. Most firms from the same 
country in our sample belong to only two clusters out of the four, while French and Italian firms 
actually belong to only one cluster. Belgian firms are the only ones to be broken down into three 
clusters (this may be due to the population covered by the Belgian data). The country effect can be 
illustrated by the following example: the average small Italian firm producing consumer goods in 1989 
is more similar to the average large Italian firm producing investment goods in 1995 than to its 
Japanese counterpart. Similarities, even among large firms, transcend nationality with difficulty. As 
suggested in the survey (Chapter I), this evidence has not one but numerous explanations: specific 
accounting methods in spite of methodological work in this field, legal contexts, trade relations, 
banking practices, development of the domestic capital market. This last determinant varies 
significantly from one country to another according to the degree of liberalisation of financial markets. 
For each of them, the average mean and standard deviations are calculated . The main results appear 
in the tables in Appendix III, which gives the characteristics of each cluster. The main cluster 




clusters 2 and 4 because they illustrate the distinction between an ‘overdraft’ and an ‘autonomy’ 
sector. 
Cluster 2 is the most cosmopolitan and can be described as a ‘typical overdraft sector’ because, in 
spite of the weight of short-term financial debt, the rate of own funds is only slightly below the 
general mean value (Box III.3). 
Box III.3 
Cluster 2 (154 observations; in the north-west quadrant and in the centre of the plot, Graph III.5) is the most 
‘cosmopolitan’, i.e. is determined least by specific national features; it groups firms from various European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and one Japanese firm. With the exception of Portugal, large firms 
are overrepresented whereas small firms are underrepresented. The Italian case is different as Cluster 2 groups together all 
Italian firms, whatever their size or sector; (in Chapter II it was observed that, for many ratios of capital structure, size is 
of no relevance in the case of Italian firms).
12  
The main features of Cluster 2 are:  
– a lower cover rate of capital employed; 
– a higher liquid capital requirement, as a consequence of the lower cover rate of capital employed; 
– higher values of the other indicators of dependence on short-term credit (short-term amount due to credit institutions 
over turnover and overall financial debt); 
– the less rapid working capital requirement turnover rate. 
For any given turnover, the firms in this subgroup hold more stock and/or offer higher trade credit to 
their customers and try to accumulate external current funds from their suppliers but also from banks 
and probably other financial creditors, such as the group to which they belong and affiliated 
companies. In other words, their greater need for liquidity for financing the operating cycle is covered 
by more external short-term resources. 
This stylised behaviour suits Italian firms, particularly small ones, which are characterised by a high 
level of stocks (80 days) and of trade debtors (130 days), only partly offset by trade creditors (94 
days) (1995 data). Therefore, the cover rate of capital employed is relatively low (68.5%) and the 
liquid capital requirement high (20%). The Italian firms’ financial pattern might be described as risky 
by comparison with the others (particularly if we take into consideration overall debt, i.e. bank debt, 
commercial debt and intra-group debt, regardless of trade debtors). However, if the Italian firms’ 
pattern of commercial performance and its effect on the structure of assets do not deserve attention, 
their capital structure might be described by comparison with the others (particularly if we take into 
consideration overall debt, i.e. bank debt, commercial debt and intra-group debt, regardless of trade 
debtors). But if the less rapid working capital requirement turnover rate is treated as a means of 
achieving competitiveness, the picture changes; the level of overall indebtedness and the share of 
short-term debt can be interpreted as a response to the size of current assets. 
                                                 
12  The grouping of large German firms in this cluster is rather unexpected. To explain this, we need to consider two points. 
Firstly, they are located near the centre, so that the above-listed characteristics of Cluster 2 are weaker and do not 
contribute  significantly to the definition of this cluster (through the definition of the components). Secondly, their 
proximity to other European firms is due to a complex set of variables which indicates the capital structure; the high 
proportion of short-term financial indebtedness of large German firms is probably the major determinant of their 
grouping. Therefore, they do not share all the characteristics of the cluster, particularly those related to the operating 




Cluster 4 can be described as an ‘autonomy sector’ (Box III.4). 
Looking at the archetypal firm in Cluster 4, which is the average medium-sized firm in France in 
1992, is less interesting than looking at small firms in Japan (debt structure in France is biased 
because of the specific nature of national accounting methods, which increase the proportion of debt 
in excess of one year, but this does not adversely affect the data analysis). 
Box III.4 
Cluster 4 (149 observations) groups together small and large Belgian firms, one single category of Spanish firms, all 
French firms and nearly all Japanese firms. Being located in the south-east quadrant of Graph III.5, many of their 
distinctive features are different to those for Cluster 2. 
The main features are: 
- a higher cover rate of capital employed; 
- a slightly higher rate of gross profit over capital employed;
13 
- a higher rate of reserves; 
- a more rapid working capital requirement turnover rate; 
- a lower rate of short-term financial debt (as proportion of turnover and overall financial debt). 
The average small Japanese firm is organised so that its working capital requirement turnover rate is 
more rapid, the number of days of stocks being the lowest (only 30 days); it favours return on capital 
employed, but cash-flow capacity is slightly lower because of financial charges and/or taxes. This 
firm has the highest reserve ratio; the level of overall financial debt is high and the debt ratio indicates 
a certain preference for long-term financing (debt with a maturity of over one year); as own funds 
and financial debt in excess of one year cover capital employed, the cash balance is roughly equal to 
zero (the liquid capital requirement is zero, hence cash and current investments equal financial short-
term debt). Therefore, for this firm, the merits of long-term banking relationships, with banks granting 
current credit when an unexpected event occurs, are fewer than for the firms in the other clusters 
whose cash balance is negative. A certain preference for long-term indebtedness may be related to 
interest rates, long-term debt traditionally being less expensive; this preference, which is customary in 
the United States, is new in Japan.
14 
Clusters 1 and 3 complement the study of the determinants of profitability. Cluster 1 groups 
together a few medium-sized and all small Austrian and German firms (Box III.5). 
Looking at the paragon or archetype, i.e. the data which is closest to the gravity centre of the cluster, 
helps in understanding Cluster 1. The paragon is the small German firm in 1993. A comparison with 
the other data of the sample for the same year shows that, as expected, its capital structure 
duplicates the features listed in Box III.5, but it also shows that many determinants of profitability 
display extreme values: the level of staff costs is the highest and is offset by the highest rates of value 
added over capital employed and turnover over capital employed. The working capital requirement 
turnover rate is slightly less rapid than the sample's overall mean because of stocks. The cover rate of 
capital employed is relatively low, with the result that the liquid capital requirement is high and the 
cash balance shows the highest negative figure.  
                                                 
13   It has been noticed that the overall profitability level is roughly comparable from one country to another, apart from 
France (Part II). 
14  The proportion of long-term debt has increased over the last ten years in Japan, while it has decreased slightly in Europe 








Cluster 1 (46 observations) groups together firms which are located in the south-west quadrant of plot 3.5 and are most 
distant from the barycentre of the first plot. It means that this cluster is the most typical. 
Its main characteristics are: 
. a higher ‘leverage’ and a higher value for ‘leverage impact’; 
. a higher level of provisions; 
. a higher value of the indicators of dependence on short-term credit and a slightly less rapid working capital requirement 
turnover rate. 
As a consequence, the rate of own funds is lower (the mean value of this cluster is half the mean value of the entire 
sample). 
The low share of own funds has no link with the level of margins and profitability, as indicated 
previously. Therefore, this low capitalisation can be explained by the weight of the other methods of 
financing: 
–  the level of provisions is structurally very high in Austria and Germany, partly because of pension 
provisions but also because of accounting customs; 
–  the high level of indebtedness corroborates the positive effect of Germanic law on the borrowing 
capacity of small and medium-sized firms. The higher leverage may also be explained by the 
German tax system which disadvantages retained benefit. 
Cluster 3 groups together firms which appear to be the opposite of the firms which characterise 
Cluster 1 (Box III.6). 
Box III.6 
Cluster 3 (137 observations) groups together Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese firms which are located in the north-
eastern part of plot 3.4. Medium-sized firms are overrepresented. Many features of this class are the opposite of the first 
one. It is characterised by: 
- a higher rate of own funds; 
- a higher rate of financial charges; 
- a higher rate of fixed assets; 
- a higher rate of solvency. 
The higher capitalisation of firms grouped in Cluster 3 is slightly related to mark-up but not to a 
higher rate of return on own funds, as displayed in Graph III.3, where profitability of own funds is 
projected near the centre of the first plot but on the southern side. Capitalisation cannot be related to 
the development of financial markets in the Iberian countries. Financial charges may be an 
explanatory variable of this self-financing structure of capital; it seems that the archetype of Cluster 3, 
namely the medium-sized Spanish firm at the beginning of this decade, chose a self-financing model 
to prevent a higher, undesirable rate of financial charges. The relative low share of financial fixed 
assets might be another explanatory variable; this ratio is found to be low in large Spanish and 
Portuguese firms. A lower rate of growth of physical investment (a datum which is not available) 




Looking at the large Portuguese firms in 1990-91 which are furthest from the gravity centre of the 
cluster adds something because these observations are, by definition, more typified.
15 Many 
indicators of profitability have extreme values: the highest cash-flow capacity is correlated with the 
lowest level and rate of staff costs (staff costs over value added), on the one hand, and the lowest 
efficiency of fixed assets, on the other. As for the structure of capital, the large Portuguese firms 
displayed the highest rate of own funds.  
Comments on Clusters 1 and 3 confirm the view that no direct link can be easily established between 
the share of own funds (as opposed to leverage) and the indicators of profitability. Small German 
firms and large Portuguese firms at the beginning of this decade provide an interesting comparison in 
that they: 
–  contrast with each other as regards the proportion of own funds; 
–  contrast with each other as regards the determinants of profitability (low as opposed to high staff 
costs; low as opposed to high efficiency of capital employed); 
–  do not contrast with each other as regards the level of profitability. 
As suggested by the comments in the cluster analysis, components of the national financial system, 
including bankruptcy regulations, relationships between banks and companies, and the accounting 
and the financing practices in each country, seem to be the most relevant determinants of financial 
patterns. 
3.  SUPPLEMENTARY EVIDENCE 
3.1  Because of the country effect, the size effect is limited but its influence on the grouping 
of firms in the BACH database is not inconsiderable. Average small firms covered by BACH 
are often close to average large firms of the same nationality. Yet, Cluster 1 does not include any 
large firms; this last category is overrepresented in Cluster 2, small firms being underrepresented 
(Appendix III). When firms of the same nationality are broken down into two or three clusters, it is 
usually according to size. 
It is interesting to observe that small firms are those which contribute most to the definition of the 
components (see Graph III.5). As small Austrian firms have a higher standard deviation than larger 
firms, they receive a higher loading in the first component.
16 If class 2 is taken as another example, 
the higher standard deviation that characterises the smaller firms in this class means that these firms 
are more typified. The weight of smaller firms in the principal component analysis has two main 
implications.  
                                                 
15   Most of the countries allow asset revaluation to take account of inflation but have very different regulations.  The effect 
can be seen in the revaluation reserves, a liabilities-side item.  In most countries the revaluation reserves are of minor 
importance.  Only Portuguese manufacturing has revaluation reserves of more than 10% of total assets (compared with 
around 1% in most of the other countries); accordingly, fixed assets over total assets are higher in Portugal than in all the 
other countries. 
16   Principal component coordinates may be biased by a few unrepresentative sample data.  Therefore a test has been 




First, it improves the statistical quality of the data analysis. If the main contributions to the 
components had come from the large firms, the results might have been unstable. Thus, in the large 
firm category, a few firms might have an overwhelming effect, and so a sample which excluded them 
would give a different result. When the main contributions come from small firms, this bias cannot be 
so important. 
The second comment is economic. If small firms contribute more to the definition of the components, 
it means that their financial patterns are more typified than larger ones. The national financial features 
are commonly assumed to have a greater influence on small firms than on large multinationals. The 
data analysis bears this out. Yet, the financial behaviour of small firms is quite distinct from one 
country to another. A complementary piece of evidence must be underlined: large firms, apart from 
those in Portugal, are closer to the barycentre than SMEs. This means that their capital structures 
tend to be more homogeneous than those of SMEs. This result is linked to globalisation, which 
reduces the effect of national financing systems.  
3.2  The influence of manufacturing is not obvious because no single sector is over- or 
underrepresented in any cluster but the fact of belonging to a sector can make a greater contribution 
to the definition of the components and hence to the definition of the clusters (these sectors are non-
durable consumer goods for Clusters 1 and 4, investment and durable consumer goods for Cluster 2, 
and intermediate products for Cluster 3). 
 
Graph III.6 Supplementary data and components 1 and 2 
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3.3  The same data analysis was conducted using BACH data for four other countries, 
namely Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. These data was excluded from 
the central data analysis because some active variables are not available and/or because accounts are 
consolidated, as in the Netherlands and the United States. Hence, they have contributed neither to 
the definition of the components nor to the definition of the clusters. They are treated as illustrative - 
not active - data and projected on the plot shaped by the first two components. In the case of the 
United States, only two size categories are available (small and medium-sized as opposed to large) 
and evidence is of limited interest because many ratios used for the cluster analysis are not available. 
Graph III.6 shows that a great deal of data tends to be concentrated near the centre. Nevertheless, 
data is spread throughout the four clusters, thus corroborating the relevance of the components. In 
the case of Sweden and the Netherlands, small firms are furthest away from the centre. This last 
observation supports the idea of greater diversity among SMEs. 
3.4  The same data analysis was conducted using BACH data in 1975-85 (Rivaud -Danset 
and Salais, 1992). The ‘active variables’ were the same, and the sample included France, Germany, 
Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. As the sample changed and as BACH data 
quality improved greatly between 1985 and 1989, comparisons have to be made very cautiously. 
Nevertheless, the main results are similar: the prominent influence of country, the not-inconsiderable 
influence of size and the insignificant influence of sector.  
Comparison of the results of the principal component analysis in 1985 and in 1989-95 leads to the 
following observations: Italian firms seem to retain roughly the same features, which characterise an 
‘overdraft sector’. In 1985 German firms contrasted with Italian ones, unlike in the 1990s. Yet, in 
1985 ‘leverage’ was already higher in Germany than in the other countries. The features of French 
firms observed in 1985 were high ‘leverage’ and a rather high rate of liquidity requirement; these 
comparative features also evolved strongly. Japanese firms showed a high diversity of capital 
structure reflecting distinct sectoral performances, and this contrasts with the relative homogeneity 
observed in the 1990s. These two last developments may be related to the liberalisation of financial 
markets, a much more active tendency in Japan and in France than in Italy and Germany. In the first 
two countries many large firms, followed by smaller ones, have sought to reduce indebtedness in the 
wake of financial liberalisation. At the same time, Japanese and French banks have been reluctant to 
lend to borrowers  offering weak guarantees because of their poor results in the 1990s. The 
comparative analysis indicates that this problem primarily concerns short-term loans. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
PCA and cluster analysis are used to provide a framework for studying differences in corporate 
finance according to country and size and their possible effects on corporate performance. Its main 
findings are the following: 
4.1.  Financial structure does not influence profitability  
The selected indicators of profitability do not correlate with any financial pattern (own funds as 




–  profitability can be achieved following distinct methods (see Parts II and IV); 
–  the financial pattern is very sensitive to country, whereas indicators of profitability and margin are 
very sensitive to size;  
–  higher profitability is an incentive to invest more than the average firm and, hence, to borrow when 
retained earnings do not cover the additional amount of capital employed. 
Indicators of profitability do not discriminate among the clusters of firms which group 
together similar data according to their financial structure. In other words, the diversity of 
financial structures does not entail any hierarchy. The two financing sectors ‘overdraft’ and 
‘autonomy’ seem sustainable, as does the high level of long-term indebtedness of Austrian and 
German SMEs. 
4.2.  Ways of financing current assets are independent of the level of own funds  
Theoretical and empirical work usually focuses on the weight of equity versus financial debt. But the 
level of own funds or of overall indebtedness does not provide enough information. In this study, 
financial debt has been broken down according to term. Understanding of the capital structure 
improves when the liabilities are broken down by date of maturity. It also improves by taking into 
account the totality of assets, i.e. fixed and current assets.  
The principal component analysis shows the independence (orthogonality) of:  
–  the axis which contrasts firms which have a high rate of equity and those which have a high rate of 
long-term indebtedness, and 
–  the axis which contrasts the autonomy sector (high cover rate of capital employed) and the 
overdraft sector (liquid capital requirement).  
These axes are separate from components 1 and 2 and, in this case, a certain orthogonality is an 
empirical result which was expected and is not a statistical artefact. This result is reliable in the 
following cases: 
–  1975, 1979 and 1985 for five or six countries, 
–  1989-96 for eight countries, 
–  1989-95 for twelve countries (the above eight, plus Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United States). 
Orthogonality of the axes means that the way in which current assets are financed is independent of 
the level of own funds; therefore, a highly capitalised firm (a feature which correlates, of course, with 
a low level of long-term debt) may rely on short-term financial indebtedness, mainly from banks. It 
indicates the interest that corporate finance has in taking into account the independence of long-term 
financial structure, on the one hand, and short-term financial structure, on the other. A more accurate 
view of the capital structure is therefore available. 
The financing requirements reflected in the working capital requirement turnover may have a certain 
impact on financial  structure (own funds group, p. 51). The greater (lesser) need for liquidity to 
finance a less (more) rapid working capital requirement rate is correlated with more (fewer) external 




not observed in the case of firms grouped in Cluster 3: a less rapid working capital requirement rate 
is correlated with a high level of own funds, while financial short-term resources do not play any 
particular role. This last case confirms the view that the observed financial structure does not lend 
itself to any straightforward interpretation. 
4.3.  Financial structure differs mostly according to the firm’s country  
The capital structure differs according to country, the financial structures of SMEs being more 
typified than those of larger firms. National financial features have, as expected, a greater 
influence on small firms than on large multinationals, and data analysis shows that large firms’ capital 
structures tend to be more homogeneous than those of SMEs.  
In spite of financial globalisation, levels of own funds show not-inconsiderable differences from one 
country to another. As methodological differences remain in BACH data, a comparison of the level 
of ratios is limited. Yet, data differences are quite large: in 1994 the capital and reserves ratio was 
15.5% in the case of small Austrian firms, 12.3% in the case of small German firms and 51.4% in the 
case of large Portuguese firms. Thus, German and Austrian SMEs will probably appear highly 
undercapitalised and risky to a foreign investor, although the level of profitability does not differ 
significantly.  
4.4.  How to evaluate SMEs  
Usually, an investor’s judgement focuses on the level of performance and on the financial structures 
observed from the balance sheet before he relates the observed ratios to standardised assessment 
norms. 
As a result of our study, the evaluation of SMEs’ quality and financing requirements must allow for: 
–  the diversity of financial structures from one country to another; 
–  their ‘real’ dynamic, i.e. rate of accumulation, which includes growth of fixed and short-term 
assets; 
–  the type of financing requirement, which may differ according to asset type; 
–  the level of performance and the different means of achieving performance (see Chapter IV). 
Box III.7 Intangible assets and valuation difficulties 
It should be borne in mind that some ‘assets’ are not accounted for in the balance sheet and hence are covered by current 
income. This is often the case with training and organisational expenditure. To this extent, the balance sheet gives only a 
limited view of firms’ assets and is not very suitable for evaluating intangible assets. Difficulties of valuing intangible fixed 
assets, in spite of their considerable importance in explaining competitiveness, are well known. Restrictions on showing 
this expenditure with assets differ between countries, with the German and Austrian standards being the most restrictive.  
Restrictions may also differ according to size, but this effect is hardly discernible. It may be suggested as an hypothesis 
that the lesser use of valued fixed assets per unit of turnover, which characterised SMEs, can be offset by greater use of 
non-valued (in the balance sheet) intangible fixed assets.  
Taking the diversity of financial structures into account is more important for SMEs than for large 
firms. International financial markets may ration capital for ‘sound’ firms that would appear 
undercapitalised in terms of international standards. For such firms, bank relationships are more 







CHAPTER IV : FORMATION OF PROFITABILITY 
1.  THEORETICAL FOUNDATINS : A BRIEF PRESENTATION  
Chapter II shows that in all the countries studied, with the exception of Portugal, large firms display 
lower levels of profitability than small to medium-sized firms. Conversely, Chapter III shows that 
there is a degree of independence between financial structure (i.e. the structure and manner in which 
assets are financed) and profitability. An examination of the formation of profitability is therefore of 
some interest. 
Firms do not directly choose a particular production process or market; they choose the products 
(and/or services) which they believe will yield profits. In doing so, they are led to implement what can 
be called different models of production, i.e. different sets of routines, organisational structures and 
operational principles which guide the firm from day to day (Storper and Salais (1997)). The 
products are defined both by the type of demand (and use for consumers) and by the way they are 
produced. Firstly, dedicated products are differentiated from generic products. A product is 
dedicated when the firm makes a particular product for each individual demand. It is generic when 
the product does not take into account individual peculiarities but aims to satisfy a large and 
anonymous market. Secondly, specialised products are differentiated from standardised products. A 
product is specialised when its production mobilises specific know-how and knowledge that are 
more or less unique and irreplaceable. It is standardised when its production relies on standard and 
widespread technologies and know-how that eliminate the idiosyncratic nature of activity. 
Thus, the characteristics of the products and assets needed must be suited to two different sites, the 
'market' and the 'organisation of the production process'. The 'market' is where flows of short-term 
assets are optimised; the 'production process' is the site where fixed assets are coordinated over the 
medium term. Firms attempt to increase their profitability by selecting products and assets adapted to 
these constraints. But the forces operating on the two sites often pull in opposite directions. These 
are not simple, “formal” quantitative forces; they are strains that the firm actually encounters, and it 
must strive to achieve a satisfactory balance between them. For instance, production of customised 
products suited to a market undergoing perpetual change – one of the features of modern markets – 
makes it possible to seek higher prices and more substantial margins, but it requires in return a high 
degree of internal flexibility and specific investment in labour skills. Conversely, serial manufacture of 
products suited to mass markets allows labour productivity to be increased and unit costs to be 
reduced, but it also requires higher capital expenditure on fixed long- and short-term tangible assets 
and acceptance of tighter margins. For the firm, the primary question is not maximisation of profit per 
se, but the coherence of its choices in order to secure profitability. Not everything is possible. For 
instance, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain high levels of labour productivity with low wages. 
We propose to test in this chapter the assumptions that firms  have therefore two distinct 
“real-world” models for the formation of profitability, one of which assigns highest priority to 
optimising the firm’s relationship with the market while the other prioritises the firm’s internal 
organisation. We also suppose that corporate organisation is shaped today by the search for 
compromises in this area. In fact, there are solutions based on the possibilities created by rapid 




differences in profitability result purely from corporate size? Or do they make different choices, 
based on their products, between a market-based and an organisation-based model of profitability? 
On this hypothesis, differences in profitability between large firms and SMEs would stem from two 
factors: (i) different uses of one or other of the models of profitability, and (ii) differences in their 
capacity to implement the models successfully. Profitability would no longer be a ratio from which 
recommendations for action could immediately be deduced. It must be seen in the broader context of 
the way in which it is formed. 
We describe below in turn the formalisation used for the present study and the results. 
2.  FORMALISATION  
Theoretically, we need to take account of a spectrum of gradations at two levels: between the “real 
world” and finance, and between microeconomics and macroeconomics. The ideal would be to start 
out from individual company data  – qualitative data for their products, their markets and their 
organisation, and quantitative data from their financial statements (management ratios). It is only at 
this level that one can hope to capture the diverse ways in which profitability is formed. Such a study 
has been made for France, using the highly detailed data provided by the Banque de France’s 
Balance Sheet Data Centre and the SESAME survey of the strategies of a sample of 2 000 firms 
(Paranque et al., 1997; 1998). This study is conclusive but cannot be replicated here. 
Our formalisation of the issue is constrained by the difficulties of formulation and estimation imposed 
by the BACH database. It is limited to the manufacturing sector, for which the BACH database is 
more representative. The BACH database supplies information aggregated into three size bands, 
three sectors and six years, that is to say, with exceptions, 3 x 3 x 6 = 54 observations per country 
only. No access to qualitative information (i.e. descriptions of products, markets, organisational 
structures, contracts or relationships with customers/suppliers or banks) is available. We must use 
account ratios. So the results suffer from limitations which have to be taken into account. 
The first step consists in defining two decompositions of the ratio “gross profit over capital 
employed”, which can be related to the two models of formation of profitability described above 
(paragraph 2.1). We then develop an econometric model which can be estimated with the available 
data (paragraph 2.2). 
2.1.  Decomposotions of the ratio “Gross profit over capital employed”.  
The two sites, market and organisation, may be expressed in quantitative terms as variables which 
compose the measurement of profitability. As in previous chapters, we measure profitability using the 
ratio “gross profit over capital employed”. Box IV.1 displays two formulae for analysing this ratio : 
one in terms of the organisation of the production process and one in terms of the market.  
2.1.1.  Profitability guided by the organisation (formula 1) 
Following formula 1, the firm’s behaviour can be described as prioritising the maximisation of labour 
productivity. It presupposes an acceptance of higher permanent investment in fixed assets and 
greater capital intensity. The emphasis here is on optimal medium-term management. The firm's 




standardising production tasks and technologies or by seeking high volume or reducing to the strict 
minimum the workforce and the various labour-related costs, such as social charges. But these 
endeavours are mutually contradictory. Any increase in labour productivity will entail substitution of 
capital for labour, which increases the level of capital tied up in fixed assets which need to be made 
profitable. 
All other things being equal, greater stability of supply, outlets and production technology will lessen 
uncertainty and hence the need for financial flexibility. It will facilitate the provision of collateral when 
seeking loans. But, on the other hand, the technological constraints increase the need for capital and 
hence the requirement for external finance. 
2.1.2.  Profitability guided by the market (formula 2) 
Following formula 2, the firm’s behaviour can be described as seeking profitability by maximising the 
mark-up ratio and by minimising the capital employed per unit of turnover. The firm prioritises short-
term management. Its objective is flexibility. This can be achieved in a number of ways, e.g. by 
managing stock or payment times or by specialising in specific goods or services. These endeavours 
may contradict each other: for example, the provision of high-quality service (maintenance, variety of 
supply, negotiation with customers) that permits higher margins may mean that fixed assets are not 
always used to the full. 
All other things being equal, lower capital intensity and/or tighter control of the operating cycle 
reduce the need for external finance and improve corporate liquidity. The other side of the coin is 
that the firm often holds specific assets (e.g. expertise, skilled labour, innovations) which are difficult 
to value. 
2.1.3.  Taking account of efficiency of capital (VA/K) 
It is possible to imagine a third model for the formation of profitability which assigns highest priority 
to maximising capital efficiency rather than labour productivity. This would be part of an overall 
system targeting maximisation of product value added: highly skilled labour, extensive internal 
processing of the product and reduction of intermediate consumption to a minimum. Unfortunately, 
given the low level of detail of the data available, this third model cannot be translated into a usable 




Box IV.1 From the profitability determinants to the ratio “gross profit over capital employed” 
Decomposition 1: Profitability based on organisation 
The following analytical formula (1) looks at the ratio “gross profit over capital employed” by emphasising the organisation 
of the production process: 
              VA 
    Gross profit   =   (1 - SC)  x               N   
  Capital employed                    VA             K + WCR 
               N 
where : 
SC   is the proportion of staff costs to value added, 
VA 
VA  is the productivity of labour, and 
 N 
 
K + WCR  is the capital employed divided by the number of workers. 
      N 
 
Decomposition 2: Profitability based on the market 
The following analytical formula (2) looks at the ratio “gross profit over capital employed”  by emphasising the marked-
based model of profitability:  
       Gross profit     =   GP  x               1    
  Capital employed      TO    WCR   +    K  
             TO       TO 
where : 
 
GP  is the gross profit par unit of turnover (mark-up ratio), 
TO 
WCR  is the working capital requirement per unit of turnover, and 
TO 
 K    is the rate of fixed assets over turnover. 
TO 
The absence of a workforce variable (N) 
The absence of any workforce variable (N) in the BACH database is particularly prejudicial to the use of the first 
decomposition. We have been obliged to use an approximated formula in which N is replaced by staff costs (SC), both for 
labour productivity (estimated by VA/SC) and for the degree to which capital substitutes for labour (estimated by K/SC). The 
respective contributions of real productivity and the cost of labour (wages plus social charges) cannot be separated out. 
Formula 1 is therefore approximated by formula 1 below: 
                VA 
   Gross profit   =   (1 - SC)    x           SC   
  Capital employed                  VA     K + WCR 





2.2.  Econometric model  
Let R be the profitability of a firm i (here, an observation is one year and one sector in a given size 
class). This is assumed to be the result of a specific compromise arrived at between the two models 
of formation of profitability discussed above. Let us call these two models RO and RM: 
      R = pO RO + pM RM    (3) 
Parameters pO and pM must be interpreted as expressing the “mean” compromise arrived at by the 
companies concerned between organisation-based and market-based formation of profitability. This 
compromise may vary, in the present case given the nature of the BACH data, by country, size and 
sector. The ultimate aim is to estimate for each country coefficients pO and pM in equation (3) in such 
a manner as to assess their specific size-related features and then to proceed to an inter-country 
comparison.  
By decomposing the ratio “gross profit over capital employed”, it is easy to deduce from the above 
formulae (1’) and (2) (Box IV.1) those variables which are correlated with the models RO and RM as 
well as the expected sign for their coefficients: 
for RO    VA (+)      K (-) 
    SC      SC 
 
for RM    GP (+)   TO (+)   WCR (-) 
     TO     K        TO 
Two technical problems arise at this point, one relating to the impossibility of estimating all 
theoretically possible coefficients and the other to the dominant influence of the variables (VA/SC 
and GP/TO in both cases). It can be seen that in both cases one variable plays a pivotal role and 
explains a large part of the variance: this is labour productivity (estimated by VA/SC) in breakdown 
(1’) for the organisation-based model and the mark-up ratio GP/TO in breakdown (2) for the 
market-based model. Lastly, we treat each country separately. 
Firstly, therefore, we used the following approximated formulae for RO and RM: 
(4)  RO = a [  VA  + b K   ] 
         SC      SC   
(5)  RM = d [  GP  + e TO + j WCR     ] 
       TO         K           TO 
in which one variable plays a pivotal role. 
Secondly, we assumed that, when using a given model of profitability, the various corporate size 
classes would differ between themselves only where coefficients a and d were concerned. 
Coefficients a and d can thus be seen to be statistical normalisation parameters for each country’s 
size classes. 
Coefficients b, e and j are, on the other hand, general parameters identical in all size classes. They 




organisation of production, RO (formula 4), or based on the market, RM (formula 5). This assumption 
that coefficients b, e and j are independent of corporate size appears acceptable in the light of the 
first step in the estimation process. 
Details of the estimation method are provided in Appendix IV.1. 
3.  RESULTS  
We present below all the results obtained before going on to discuss them country by country. 
3.1.  Results in general  
Table 4.1 contains the estimated values of the variables present in the explanatory equations for the 
two profitability formation models RO et RM. 
In general, the results are satisfactory in econometric terms although some problems remain. The 
R-square and coefficients are usually significant and have the expected sign. Iterative estimation 
usually produces convergence in a reasonable number of iterations. However, in a few instances, 
there is no convergence or the convergence is towards minimum local likelihood. We carried out a 
number of tests, modifying the initialisation or using data for the most detailed sector breakdown 
possible (10 subsectors). The outcome was useful in some cases and fruitless in others. We could 
not obtain results for Japan. France raises a problem which appears paradoxical in the light of the 
results obtained in our studies based on individual data: it proved impossible to arrive at an 
econometrically satisfactory estimation. Nevertheless, we give the initial estimations in Table 4.1, but 
we could not estimate parameters pO and pM for France (see below).  
Comparing the estimated coefficients between countries, it is apparent that, where the effect of a 
given variable is concerned, the values are quite comparable, and this gives the equations some 
degree of general applicability.  
The following are therefore verified for all countries for which estimation was possible:  
1. Organisation-based formation of profitability : the positive pivotal role of the variable VA/SC 
(combined labour productivity and control of labour costs) and the negative influence of capital-
labour substitution (approximated by K/SC). 
2. Market-based formation of profitability : the positive pivotal role of the mark-up ratio GP/TO and 
two influences, that of capital turnover (TO/K), which is positive, and that of the level of net 
circulating assets (WCR/TO), which is negative. 
Table 4.2 contains by country and by corporate size the estimations obtained for parameters pM and 
pO . The sum pM + pO has been constrained to be equal to unity. Such estimation proved possible, 
except for large firms in France and Spain, and was generally significant. We can now proceed to 




3.2.  Use of the profitability formation models varies by country and corporate size  
The advantages described at the beginning of this chapter as regards SMEs and large firms can be 
found in each of the models. Thus there is no straightforward correlation to be found such as those 
often mentioned as existing between SMEs, flexibility and the RM market-based profitability model, 
or between large corporations, rigidity and the RO organisation-based profitability model. In the RM 
model we can find the capital turnover ratio, which is, in the light of empirical studies, favourable to 
SMEs, in addition to the mark-up ratio and the level of working capital requirement, which are 
favourable to large firms. In the RO model the VA/SC ratio is favourable to large companies and the 
K/SC ratio to SMEs. Corporate size does not strictly distinguish between firms in relation to their 
mode of formation of profitability 
Nevertheless, the econometric estimation is useful in three ways. Firstly, it highlights the predominant 
choice of model according to size and country. Secondly, it shows that these models are equally 
profitable (while some countries or corporate categories fail to use a model effectively, others 
manage to do so). Lastly, it confirms what are the main causes of size-based differences in 
profitability. 
(a) More frequent use of the RM model on average; systematic use of this model by small firms 
Generally speaking, the R M model for the formation of profitability based on the market is 
encountered more frequently than the R O organisation-based model. Those who use it are small 
(pM=0.9) and medium-sized (0.8) German firms, small Portuguese firms (0.8), and small (0.7) and 
medium-sized (0.9) Spanish firms, plus large Austrian, Portuguese and Spanish firms. Conversely, 
the R O model seems to predominate only for large German firms (0.7) and their medium-sized 
Austrian (0.7) and Belgian (0.8) counterparts. The importance of such results is weakened by the 
difficulties in arriving at a good specification for R O owing to a lack of data on workforce size. 
However, the outcome does tally with the observation  – frequent in sector- or company-based 
studies – of a move toward flexibility in the organisation of production. In actual fact, small firms 
assign highest priority to the RM market-based model in all the countries studied. 
(b) Tighter targeting of differences in profitability between SMEs and large firms 
It is possible, using Table 4.2 and Appendix IV, which contains the mean values of ratios by detailed 
sector, to focus on the main differences in profitability by corporate size in the countries under 
consideration. It is sufficient to refer to the dominant model and the mean value of the corresponding 
explanatory values. But a precise explanation would call for closer investigation of each country using 
other data. The remarks which follow are therefore qualified. 
Germany 
Large enterprises use the R O model, and their low profitability can be attributed to the pivotal 
variable VA/SC. Despite a much more capital-intensive organisation, the ratio VA/SC is not higher 
in the larger companies, especially where manufacturers of intermediate and capital g oods are 
concerned. It is not possible to discern any inadequacy of labour productivity or excessive wage 





Large Austrian firms use the RM model. Their low relative profitability is due to their mark-up ratio. 
Belgium 
Medium-sized enterprises are the most profitable. They use the RO model. Their strengths are their 
good VA/SC ratio and relatively low capital-labour substitution. 
Italy 
There is a balanced compromise between the two models in all size bands. There is little distinction 
between firms on the basis of profitability. Medium-sized companies seem to win out marginally in 
both tables. 
Portugal 
Large firms, exceptionally, are significantly more profitable than small ones. Both use the RM model. 
It is the mark-up ratio which makes the difference between companies, in favour of the larger firms. 
Spain 
The situation is the opposite of that in Portugal. All sizes of company use the R M model, but the 




Table 4.1 The two models for profitability formation, by country and corporate size 
  RO organisation-based  
formation of profitability 
RM market-based  


















Country  Small  Medium  Large    Small  Medium  Large     
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NB. The number of iterations required for convergence is given in brackets after the country.  








Gross profit/Capital employed  PO (pivotal variable VA) 
          SC 
PM (pivotal variable GP) 
           TO 
  Small  Medium  Large  Small  Medium  Large  Small  Medium  Large 














Austria  18.8  18.3  17.6  0.35  0.69  -0.02  0.65  0.31  1.02 
Belgium  16.1 
(*/ME) 
18.5  16.6  0.44  0.82  0.52  0.56  0.18  0.48 
France  23.5  19.3 
(*/SME) 
         
Italy  15.9  15.4  0.47  0.51  0.58  0.51 


























NB. An asterisk under a figure indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from that indicated by an abbreviation - small (S) medium-sized (M) or large (L) enterprises  
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CHAPTER V : RECOMMENDATIONS 
The point of departure must be the type of financing required by European SMEs, with their various 
nationalities and specific features, to expand their businesses. There is increasing awareness in every 
field that access to financing and guarantees are central to the future of European construction (level 
of employment, occupational integration and training of young people, regional development in the 
EU) and, above all, are necessary in order to create an efficient, innovative economic network 
without which European groups cannot remain competitive on global markets.  
The financing of SMEs must not be viewed strictly from the standpoint of the need for wider access 
to financial markets and the need for security on the part of external investors, markets and financial 
institutions, although these needs must obviously be given adequate attention. There are four reasons 
for this: 
–  The share capital of SMEs is often in the hands of the founders and/or their families, for whom 
controlling ownership is more important than opening up to outside investors.  
–  Taken by itself, risk assessment of SMEs requires an investment in information that is country-
specific and costly when it is individualised. The standard instruments and screening methods do 
not take into account the characteristic advantages of SMEs (skills, specific assets, etc.).  
–  SMEs have specific financing requirements that are due to their role in the economy, mainly their 
flexibility, their innovativeness and their employment potential. It is well known that it is difficult to 
satisfy the financial needs of highly innovative SMEs using traditional screening and guarantee 
procedures. The need to have financing available in order to react quickly to unexpected events is 
particularly important for the vitality of SMEs ; there are different ways of financing such a need, 
financial markets being rather inadequate. 
–  Using the BACH database, the data analysis shows that a high level of profitability can be 
achieved by firms whose financial patterns are distinct. A higher level of own funds does not 
automatically result in better performances and higher gross profitability. For instance, 
supplementary funds may be used as a substitute for debt and such a change in the composition of 
financial resources may be the proper answer to a rise in the interest rate but, of course, it will 
have no impact on the efficiency of the production process or on the growth of the enterprise. 
This evidence moderates the arguments advanced in favour of wider access by SMEs to financial 
markets. 
1.  SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE FINANCING REQUIREMENTS OF SMES 
Taking the type of financing required by SMEs as the point of departure presupposes taking a new 
look at financing based on the specific economic features of the financing requirements of SMEs. The 
study of these features underlies the entire report. 
The primary point to consider is the role played by SMEs in the European economy from the 
standpoint of the products and services they provide. The vast majority of their products and 
services are produced on a small or medium scale. They are aimed at specific, changing needs 
whose specifications, development and delivery lead times and quantities are often controlled by the 
major contractors (such as automobile makers, leading building and public works contractors, large  
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public service providers) or large intermediaries (such as supermarket purchasing groups). In order 
to remain in these markets and to expand, the required assets must be flexible and qualitatively 
redeployable for  new orders. At identical or nearly identical prices, it is skills, responsiveness, 
reputation, experience and innovation that become the principal competitive advantages 
differentiating one SME from another. This means that the specific organisational system adapted to 
each firm must be continually adjusted.
17 The unforeseeable human element predominates in 
management over the stable physical element.  
There are three features defining this position: market uncertainty; insertion in networks; priority given 
to financing the operating cycle. 
1.1.  Market uncertainty  
Uncertainty, more than foreseeable risk, marks the external environment and internal management of 
SMEs. Their production systems are less capital-intensive than LEs. SMEs correspond to the model 
of ‘market-based’ profit formation (explained in Chapter IV), in which three main variables have to 
be either maximised (+) or minimised (-) : margin rate over turnover (+); rate of rotation of capital 
employed (+); working capital requirement in relation to turnover (-). This model follows the broad 
view of investment selected for this study. Although the margin rate over turnover is lower for SMEs 
than for LEs, their lower capital intensity entails higher profitability. As they are not very capital-
intensive and focus on products, technologies and types of organisation that encourage rapid capital 
rotation, they require fewer fixed assets but more current assets and short-term debt, a feature 
observed in all the selected countries. This data indicates how SMEs manage flexibility, along with 
their financial constraints. 
Intangible investments and the quality and amount of current assets available at the time and place 
desired by the other side are of primary concern since, at a given fixed asset level, they are the ones 
that will or will not allow firms to win market share and expand. With the notion of venture capital, 
the literature on financing innovation stresses radical innovation (the use of a scientific discovery, for 
example). Yet, aside from start-ups by researchers or in the high-tech sector (which naturally must 
not be underestimated), most SMEs, whether they belong to a mature sector or not, rely on gradual 
product and process innovation to maintain their competitive edge. Gradual innovation presupposes 
an ongoing flow of small (and sometimes large) expenditures in various parts of the organisation at 
the right moment. Its content is mostly developed internally. These are investments, but the 
expenditures are incorporated into those of the operating cycle. Only rarely are they subject to the 
formal procedures of external financing or to specific internal accounting. 
1.2.  Insertion in networks  
No entrepreneur in isolation can survive for long in an environment that is a priori so hostile. Thus, 
one of the essential characteristics of every dynamic SME is to belong to a network of actors in 
which it must play an active role in order to reap any benefits. There are many such networks. First, 
                                                 
17  A study for which 500 of Europe's most dynamic entrepreneurs were interviewed indicates that flexibility in the 
production process and knowledge of technological developments are considered equally important, efficiency of 
production being the more important aspect of the production process for the future growth of their company (EFER, p. 
52).  
  69
there are those that circulate information and experience: trade organisations, consultants in various 
subjects (technology, management, markets) and training systems. Then there are those that make 
valuations, define quality standards and assess the quality of a firm’s products (public and 
professional agencies, contractors’ own departments and commercial intermediaries). Finally, there 
are those that form the lasting structure of markets and production systems. These networks are set 
up by intra-firm buying and selling relationships and various types of cooperation. They can be 
vertical owing to increasingly frequent inclusion of SMEs in groups or horizontal, as in the case of 
regional economic networks specialising in certain products. The study has shown that, at the end of 
the period, SMEs are generally more burdened by inventories and/or commercial loans than large 
firms. This is partly due to vertical relationships with contractors and purchasing groups.  
These networks stem from the current pattern of division of labour, which is gaining hold in every 
field of activity, with each firm trying to establish its identity (and its existence) on the basis of 
recognised products and skills. The common feature is that firms operate without any public 
intervention except in a subsidiary sense, through the profession, group or region. Their common 
feature also lies in the fact that these networks all generate information. Thus, the «right» assessment 
of the future of the firm and the degree of financial risk it represents may be found by gathering and 
comparing information.  
1.3.  Priority to financing the operating  
Given the characteristics of their markets, small and medium-sized enterprises fall within the scope of 
the case study we have highlighted in the theoretical literature: the need to have financing available in 
order to seize unexpected investment opportunities. This need for readily available funds appears to 
be a structural characteristic: to be in a position to satisfy a new customer; to adjust to sudden 
changes of scale and lead time; to innovate when and where is specifically necessary. But while the 
literature maintains the standard notion of investment (long-term investment which should guarantee 
an anticipated return over several years), here the concept of investment has been broadened to 
include operating cycle expenditures. The uncertainty of the expected return remains but, instead of 
long-term uncertainty, it is focused on the operating cycle (which is itself shorter than for a mass 
production process) and more specifically on the extent of the market risks that will have to be 
covered during the cycle. What becomes the guiding factor is the expected margin rate on turnover 
generated during an operating cycle by the new market opportunities that the firm has the capacity to 
seize. The firm can rather easily arrive at a reasonable estimate of this margin rate in the light of past 
experience, whereas the chronicle of future annual returns is far more uncertain. 
In order to finance and guarantee the economic development of SMEs, they must be assured of the 
availability of funds during the operating cycle. This assurance will give them the ability, in day-to-day 
operations, to make the «right» development decisions in an uncertain context. Access to available 
financing poses two problems: 
1. This access may take several forms: self-financing through available reserves (on condition that the 
firm produces a sufficient cash-flow margin) or building up a borrowing capacity that is readily 
available if need be. Recourse to the securities market seems less of a priority in so far as the latter’s 
role is not to offer such assurance.   
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2. This access is subject to a reliable assessment of the firm’s «quality» by external investors and 
lenders. Yet such screening is a delicate operation since it concerns specific assets whose proper use 
and returns depend significantly on the ability of the firm’s managers to distinguish good opportunities 
from bad ones and to form adequate action plans. Scoring methods are ill-adapted in this instance.  
2.  ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY OF SMES  
The difficulties related to financing are one of the main obstacles to the start-up and expansion of 
firms. They handicap the everyday financial security of firms, particularly SMEs. Yet such security is 
the prerequisite for SMEs placing their advantages in the s ervice of economic development. 
Economic flexibility is one of their major advantages. 
2.1.  From economy flexibility…  
This study has stressed a particular aspect of the financing problem which is relatively neglected, 
namely economic and financial flexibility. The emphasis placed on the problem of financing intangible 
assets which are particularly costly for high-tech firms tends to overshadow the question of financing 
reversible assets, i.e. asset amounts that vary during the period. By definition, they cannot be 
accurately captured in the balance sheet. The amount of reversible assets fluctuates, of course, 
according to seasonable needs linked to the firm’s business activity, but it may also fluctuate in a 
random fashion. In their day-to-day existence, firms must cope with economic contingencies that are 
analysed either as accidents or as favourable opportunities for business growth. Problems of internal 
organisation, difficulties facing suppliers or customers that modify commercial credit terms, and 
unexpected orders initially translate into an increase in operating assets which may subsequently lead 
to a lasting increase in short-term or even long-term assets. The economic flexibility of a firm 
expresses its ability to react to unanticipated internal and external events which may lead 
to a variation in the growth of so-called «reversible» assets, thereby raising the question of 
its financial flexibility. 
The question of economic flexibility is even more acute for SMEs than for large firms. Indeed, the 
fact that small firms depend on a limited number of customers makes the pace of orders particularly 
irregular and increases the impact of late payment by customers. Moreover, intra-firm ties involving 
inventories and commercial loans have differing effects on them depending on their size. Within the 
framework of a subcontracting relationship, small firms may be led to keep products in stock that 
have been developed at the request of the contractor. This practice, which enables the latter to keep 
inventories as low as possible, turns the subcontractor into an unpaid lender. 
In other words, a firm’s ability to handle economic contingencies depends on the extent of its safety 
net, which may be economic and/or financial. The expression "safety net" is illustrated by local, often 
informal SME networks which encourage the transfer of redeployable assets and business activities 
and therefore improve the return on capital employed. The security and profitability of SMEs may 
improve when their activity fits into a network of firms of the same size engaged in complementary, 
or even competing, business.  
  71
2.2.  ... to financial flexibility and security  
The survival and development of these firms presupposes that they enjoy a certain degree of 
financial flexibility, defined as the capacity to mobilise rapidly and at reasonable cost the 
financing required to respond to contingencies. In the absence of financial flexibility, a firm’s 
survival will, in the event of a recession, depend mainly on an adjustment of wage costs whereas, in 
the event of an economic upturn, certain growth opportunities will not be seized. At the 
macroeconomic level, this question is particularly important for countries suffering from high 
unemployment rates. Indeed, many SMEs tend to avoid passing on quickly into workforce 
management the effects of a downturn in business. A lack of financial flexibility will prevent a firm 
from financing the growth of raw materials and work in progress in the event of a recovery. If such 
behaviour becomes widespread among small and medium-sized firms, economic recovery may well 
be stifled. 
The sources of a firm’s financial flexibility are: 
(i)  internal liquidity arising from own funds and, more generally, from all stable capital, i.e. own 
funds and medium- to long-term debt, which the firm has available at the time the contingency arises; 
(ii)  assured borrowing power at reasonable terms. 
External liquidity may come from financial markets, but in Europe commercial paper markets are a 
recent phenomenon and concern only a limited number of large corporations; consequently, the 
external liquidity required to finance a reversible asset variation comes mainly from borrowing, either 
from banks or possibly from companies within the same group. 
For a small firm, a long-standing relationship with a bank may encourage certain types of short-term 
loan guarantees in the form of authorised credit lines. This formula provides the firm with a financial 
safety net by allowing it to borrow, if necessary, at contractually predetermined terms (amount, 
interest rate, guarantee). 
3.  INTERNAL LIQUIDITY: ADVANTAGES, ROLES AND SOURCES OF OWN FUNDS 
The emphasis placed on the role of own funds in financing firms stems from their nature and function, 
but this emphasis tends to overshadow the fundamental obstacles to increasing the equity of small 
firms. 
3.1.  Own funds have two advantages :  
1.  They consist of capital that does not have to be reimbursed. 
2.  Capital remuneration is not pre-fixed according to a contractual schedule since dividend 
distribution will vary according to income and investment projects.  
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3.2.  The main role of own funds is to guarantee the firm’s solvency, in other words, its ability to 
honour its financial commitments. It acts as a safety reserve for the firm and its economic agents, 
allowing it to cope with contingencies. It encourages the firm to invest. Its ultimate purpose is to 
cover financial risk since it will enable the lender to cover all or some of the debts contracted by the 
company in the event of the latter’s inability to do so. It is a sign of the firm’s financial soundness.  
In short, the emphasis on the role of own funds arises partly from the inherent advantages of these 
resources, which are not contractual in origin, and partly from their role as a sign which influences the 
terms (amount, interest rate, length, guarantees) of access to the loans required for the firm’s growth. 
The importance that lenders, especially banks, assign to own funds varies widely from one country to 
the next, as demonstrated by the wide disparity in capitalisation rates. 
3.3.  There are three different sources of own  
1.  Cash flow and earnings not distributed to shareholders make up an essential source of own 
funds (between 26% and 70% on average for the firms in the BACH database); 
2.  Shares issued to partners; 
3.  Shares floated on the financial market (by making calls on the public’s savings). 
By definition, the first two methods run up against limits in any given firm. The cash flow requirements 
of a small firm are by nature limited. Certainly, the ability to issue shares to non-public shareholders, 
i.e. to make a direct subscription call without going through the financial market, can be extended. 
Thus, the European Commission made a proposal to the Council of Ministers to expand employee 
shareholding opportunities and issued a call for ‘business angels’ (COM (1998) 222, p. 10 and 
COM (1998) 255).  In both cases, investment with a long maturity provides firms with stable 
resources. 
The only way firms can raise very high amounts of capital is by calling on financial markets. This latter 
source of capital is not, however, available to the vast majority of small and medium-sized firms. 
Only innovating firms that are developing a project which is likely to generate an unusually high rate 
of turnover growth and profitability can hope to interest venture-capital companies and raise funds on 
financial markets. The obstacles impeding the expansion of venture-capital companies in continental 
Europe are due not so much to specific national features of the supply of venture capital, such as a 
lack of national pension funds, as to the particular characteristics of this form of financing. Indeed, the 
cost of studying applications and the rather high risk of project failure lead venture-capital investors 
to select only a very small percentage of firms in any country. 
It is unlikely that the globalisation of financial markets will perceptibly change these terms of access 
for the vast majority of SMEs. This study has underscored the diversity of financial structures and 
confirmed that the financial structures of small firms are more sensitive to specific national features 
than those of large corporations. This diversity is a handicap as regards the acquisition of shares by 
foreign investors, who must indeed ascertain to what extent the indicators taken from a small firm’s 
balance sheet reflect particular national features or a genuine lack of solvency. 
Thus, when it comes to external financing, the vast majority of SMEs depend mainly on banks and 
secondarily on the parent company, when they belong to a group. This situation is unlikely to change 
in the future.  
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 The difficulties involved in the screening of companies by external investors and the requirement of a 
high return on assets which they impose affect firms of all sizes, but especially small firms, and explain 
why this type of own funds can be more costly than indebtedness. 
4.  EXTERNAL LIQUIDITY: BANKING RELATIONSHIPS 
The role of banks must be underlined for the following reasons: 
–  evidence from data analysis shows, firstly, that short-term debt is relatively more important for 
SMEs than for LEs and, secondly, that in some selected countries a low level of own funds is 
offset by a high level of long-term financial debt provided mainly by banks; 
–  not only are banks the traditional suppliers of short-term resources but they are also in a 
particularly good position to offer borrowing power to SMEs in response to their need for 
financial flexibility. 
Yet, there is nothing to indicate that financial changes which occurred during the last two decades 
have improved the  relationship between banks and SMEs in most European countries. 
Recommendations must take into account the impact of specific national features on this relationship. 
Among the propositions of general validity regarding banking relationships, this study aims to 
emphasise two points: 
–  the advantages of bank credit guarantees, 
–  the difficulty of assessment. 
4.1.  Guaranteeing borrowing capacity  
Large firms are used to negotiating guarantees, e.g. back-up liquidity lines from banks, which 
supplement their issues of short-term securities on the financial market. However, bank credit 
guarantees are also important for firms that cannot issue securities on the markets but need a safety 
net for the financing of contingencies. SMEs are particularly concerned as their liquid  capital 
requirements are higher than those of large corporations in four out of the eight countries (lower in 
only two countries) selected in this study and because the proportion of short-term (versus long-
term) financial debt tends to be higher than in LEs. Credit guarantees – provided at reasonable cost - 
can ease financial constraints and help to respond to a shock (for instance, an unexpected rise in 
trade debtors), to ward off bankruptcy and to react to an opportunity of expanding into new 
markets. 
Nevertheless, the contribution of banks to SME financing poses the question of their screening and 
monitoring. 
4.2.  Dealing with the question of SME screening and monitoring  
In most countries SMEs are subject to substantial risk premiums which add to their debt load. 
Moreover, it is common knowledge that in many countries they are significantly more affected by the 
risk of credit rationing, which here refers to the volume of funds made available by banks and not to 
interest rates.  
  74
The risk premium borne by SMEs and the credit rationing are generally explained by the greater 
danger of bankruptcy.
18 The cost of bankruptcy depends on regulations and this study has 
strengthened the view that regulations favourable to banks allow the cost of bankruptcy to be 
reduced and encourage the granting of loans to small firms on more favourable terms, with respect to 
both amounts and rates. Regulations allowing banks to obtain loan guarantees for a reasonable 
period and encouraging them to monitor the asset quality of customer firms help SMEs to obtain 
loans at reasonable interest rates. 
It is also quite likely that the risk premium borne by small firms includes a surcharge for screening and 
monitoring them. The unit cost of screening and monitoring is high for several reasons: as a general 
rule, the amount at stake is rather limited; small firms have more specific features and hence the 
assessment of their quality is poorly adapted to standardised risk analysis. 
To evaluate the risk attaching to a small firm, banks and credit institutions such as those specialised in 
finance leasing often rely on information provided by external organisations. Thus, in some countries, 
the central bank provides banks with company ratings. Gaining access to assessments supplied by 
external organisations is a very important means of reducing the cost of bank screening of small loan 
applications. This information can play a decisive role, in particular when a firm contacts a bank for 
the first time. Information on the quality of the borrower is, however, likely to present several 
disadvantages; it tends to focus on the financial elements taken from the balance sheet, especially the 
level of own funds, which gives an overly static vision of the firm. This study has called attention to 
the fact that the level of own funds is, of course, a good indicator of immediate solvency, but an 
imperfect indicator of future solvency. Any assessment of a firm’s ability to reimburse its medium- 
and long-term debt must include its ability to maintain its markets and organisation and therefore take 
into account its investment strategy in the broad sense of the term. A high own funds contribution 
level may well encourage investment, but it may also be the simple result of an insufficiently dynamic 
investment policy. 
Banks and organisations that provide financial quality assessments of firms would do well to examine 
the financing terms by mobilising several performance indicators that account for the firm’s own 
dynamism. This study has shown that these indicators must be interpreted in relation to the diversity 
of profitability determinants and the existence of comparative advantages (and handicaps) of SMEs. 
Monitoring company risk is also a source of expense for the bank. The cost of monitoring may be 
reduced by the existence of privileged relations between the small firm and a bank, viz. the German 
Hausbank model. Concentrating the firm’s financial services and bank account management within a 
single credit organisation makes it possible to reduce the unit cost of loan monitoring. 
Banks are accustomed to asking firms applying for loans to provide guarantees the amounts of which 
vary according to national procedures, the degree of long-standing relationship between the bank 
and the customer, the quality of the firm, the type of l oan, etc. An insufficient ability to offer 
guarantees, particularly when the firm’s assets are primarily intangible and therefore difficult to 
redeploy, can be an obstacle to receiving a loan. Belonging to a more or less formalised network 
                                                 
18  This argument does not take into account the cost of restructuring the firm, which allows it to avoid bankruptcy. 
Reorganisation costs are assumed to be higher for large corporations than for SMEs since this is the normal way of 
resolving the difficulties they face.  
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constitutes an advantage for SMEs. The expansion of the system of guarantees provided by external 
organisations particularly able to assess the quality of the firm may, on the other hand, help SMEs to 
obtain loans. 
A certain upward trend of medium- to long-term bank loans can be observed in several countries in 
the sample, particularly Japan. This trend may have a favourable impact for non-financial firms, 
allowing them to gain access to stable capital at a stable rate of interest (nevertheless, maturity may 
be long but interest rates may be reviewable at any time or renegotiable at fixed intervals so that the 
rate may move in line with short-term rates; hence, the advantages of long-term loans are reduced; 
this practice is common in most countries selected in this study). By granting long-term loans, 
however, banks run a particular risk of transforming short-term deposit liabilities into long-term 
assets. This additional risk may encourage banks to be particularly selective in granting loans and 
may favour the financing of projects that require relatively large amounts of capital. This may be to 
the detriment of small enterprises with no major projects but which need mostly short-term financing 
at reasonable cost.  
To summarise, the question of screening small firms implies that recognition be given to their specific 
features, which are an obstacle to developing standardised methods of analysis. Data analysis shows 
that, in most of the countries, the financial pattern of SMEs is more typified than that of LEs. This 
difference may be a handicap if the financial pattern of large enterprises is considered to be better. 
Screening costs may be reduced by developing the client relationship and/or by relying on a network 
that provides banks with information - signals - concerning their quality. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The economic flexibility of a firm expresses its ability to react adequately to unanticipated internal 
or external events. The firm’s trajectory – its dynamics – is built on the basis of these responses. 
They may lead to an increase in "reversible" assets, thereby raising the question of its financial 
flexibility, defined as the capacity to mobilise rapidly and at reasonable cost the capital required to 
respond to an economic contingency.  
2. The existence of good relationships with one bank or a small number of banks fosters the firm’s 
ability: 
–  to acquire the stable capital that will supplement the contributions to own funds required to 
finance an investment project, 
–  to obtain the liquidity necessary to finance an increase in its reversible assets, defined as an 
unexpected increase in its assets which is unlikely to last. 
Good relationships with banks that give firms borrowing power allow them to ease the actual as well 
as potential financial constraint and therefore contribute to their dynamism. 
3. More generally, the actors in a SME need an economic and financial safety net. For SMEs that 
are independent of a financial group, this comprises a network of other SMEs, banks with which it 
has a good relationship as well as private and/or public organisations that may provide a 
relevant assessment of their quality and, if need be, contribute to their financial guarantee. This 
safety net meets their need for economic and/or financial flexibility.  
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1. BACH PRESENTATION 
 
Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised (BACH) 
The BACH project was started in 1985 in order to supplement or replace information sources 
already used within DG II for its analyses of the financial structure and performance of European 
companies as well their US and Japanese competitors. Prior to 1985 data was not broken down by 
size, and a lack of harmonised data permitted few comparisons between countries. The Commission 
thus initiated the BACH project, in particular in order to make comparisons between different sizes 
of enterprises. BACH is the result of a close cooperation between both the European Commission 
and the European Committee of Central Balance-sheet Data Offices. 
Harmonisation was at the centre of this revision, with comparability as the main objective. To make 
comparative analyses possible, the basic accounts are harmonised according to a single layout 
consistent with the Fourth European Accounting Directive. The Directive does not aim to achieve 
complex standardisation of accounting rules but instead comparability and equivalence of financial 
information. It allows the preservation of the different accounting traditions. The specific nature of 
national accounting methods and the difficulty of drawing up accounting documents a posteriori 
using a common layout thus restrict the degree of data harmonisation. Harmonisation is therefore still 
incomplete at international level and even at European level. Nevertheless, BACH is the most 
advanced publicly available database for comparisons between the f inancial structures and 
performances of SMEs and those of LEs. 
Although the lack of harmonisation is a problem to be resolved, it may be due to some accounting 
customs that reflect organisational features. In Germany, for instance, the amounts owed by a firm to 
the parent company cannot be apportioned between financial and trade creditors. The likelihood is 
that, if German bankers had judged this distinction to be important, they would have prompted 
managers to introduce it in their accounts. 
Comparisons in terms of level are more difficult than trend comparisons. They call for knowledge of 
the particular characteristics of the national accounting methods and of the financial environment of 
each country. This report will draw attention to the most important  differences in accounting 
practices that may distort results. 
Representativeness 
The national bodies responsible for centralising balance-sheet data supply the Commission with 
aggregated information. The Commission assumes that the samples used are representative as the 
data is published and analysed by those bodies. 
In one country, Belgium, data is exhaustive, while in most of the other countries representativeness is 
good although, in some of them, it is better for large firms than for SMEs.  
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Countries 
The BACH database covers 13 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States. 
Finland is not taken into account in the present analysis owing to lack of data; other countries are 
taken into account in the data analysis only (Chapter III of the report), and this for different reasons: 
Denmark owing to missing data, the Netherlands owing to consolidated data (see accounting data) 
and Sweden owing to inexplicable observations. The United States and the United Kingdom deserve 
special treatment as, in their case, the analysis is of particular interest. But the US sample suffers from 
a lack of data. The United Kingdom is a special case as data is supplied by a private national body 
and not included in BACH. Moreover, the data quality of the UK sample is low on account of a lack 
of representativeness as regards small companies. 
Years 
Chronological series are available which vary in length from one country to another. This report 
covers the period from 1990 to 1996. It starts in 1990 because until then some participating 
countries did not supply data broken down according to the common size criterion, namely turnover. 
Size 
A distinction is made between three categories of company: 
- small companies with a turnover of less than ECU 7 million, 
- medium-sized companies with a turnover of between ECU 7 million and ECU 40 million, 
- large companies with a turnover in excess of ECU 40 million. 
Sectors 
Data has been grouped together in an aggregate common nomenclature based on the new NACE to 
three digits.  
This study covers manufacturing only as this industry provides the best-quality data. Coverage of 
services is poorer and may not always be representative. Manufacturing can be broken down into 
three sectors: 
-  intermediate products, 
-  investment goods and consumer durables, 
-  non-durable consumption goods. 
Accounting data 
The BACH accounting layout comprises a balance sheet and a profit and loss account, enabling not 
only basic items but also some financial balances considered particularly useful for financial purposes 
to be shown. 
Some countries publish consolidated data, an accounting practice which disregards debt and loans 
within companies belonging to the same group. Therefore, the overall level of indebtedness is lower 
when data is consolidated and comparisons with unconsolidated data are not possible.  
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2. REPRESENTATIVENESS OF SAMPLES  
 
Country  Source  Number of 
companies 
Cover rate 
(% of turnover) 
Remark 
Representativeness of samples for countries studied in the report 
Austria  Oesterreichische Nationalbank  2554* 
(in 1992) 
54%*  Data for 1996 is not available 
Belgium  National Bank of Belgium  19238* 
(in 1993) 
99.6%*   
France  Centrale des Bilans de la  
Banque de France 
26860* 
(in 1992) 
63.8%*   
Germany  Deutsche Bank  11046* 
(in 1992) 
50.1%*  Data for 1996 is not available 
Italy  Centrale dei Bilanci  19870* 
(in 1993) 
54.6%*   
Portugal  Banco de Portugal  13133** 
(in 1994) 
56%*   
Spain  Banco de Espana  7500** 
(since 1988) 
45%**  Representativeness of firms is very 
low for small enterprises 
Japan  Ministry of Finance  20000**    Representative sample (based on a 
comparison with an exhaustive 
file) 
Representativeness of samples for countries included in the report but studied separately 
US  Department of Commerce  9300 
(industry and 
distributive trades) 
  Consolidated data 
Two sizes available 
UK 
 
  574*  86%*  Consolidated data 
Representativness of firms is very 
low for small enterprises 
Representativeness of samples for countries not included in the report 
Denmark  Statistics Denmark  3000*     
Finland  Statistics Finland  1464* 
(in 1993) 
86%*   
Netherlands  Centraal Bureau voor  
de Statistiek 
9500**  75%** 
of balance-sheet total 
Consolidated data 
Sweden  Statistics Sweden  15900**     
Note :   ** All sectors included. 
           * Only manufacturing.  
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A. Capital souscrit non versé Subscribed capital unpaid
C. Actifs immobilisés Fixed assets
C.1 Immobilisations incorporelles Intangible fixed assets
C.1.1 Frais d'établissement Formation (preliminary) expenses
C.1.5* Autres immobilisations incorporelles Other intangible fixed assets
C.2 Immobilisations corporelles Tangible fixed assets
C.2.1 Terrains et constructions Land and buildings
C.2.2 Installations techniques et machines Plant and machinery
C.2.3 Autres installations, outillage, mobilier Other fixtures
C.2.4 Acomptes versés et immobilisations en cours Payments on account and assets in construction
C.3 Immobilisations financières Financial fixed assets
  C.3.1/3 Parts dans des entreprises liées et participations Shares in affiliated undertakings and participating interests 
C.3.8* Autres immobilisations financières Other financial fixed assets
D. Actifs circulants Current assets
D.1 Stocks Stocks
D.1.1 Matières premières et consommables Raw materials and consumables
D.1.4. Acomptes versés Payments on account
D.1.5* Autres stocks Other stocks
D.2 Créances Debtors
D.2.1 Créances résultant de ventes et de services Trade debtors
D.2.7* Autres créances Other debtors
D.3 Valeurs mobilières Current investments
D.4 Avoirs en banque, chèques et encaisse Cash at bank and in hand
E. Comptes de régularisation Prepayments and accrued income
AE.* Total de l'actif Total assets
(*) Rubrique non conforme à la 4ème directive européenne / Item not in conformity with the 4th european directive.
 SCHEMA BACH




F. Dettes dont la durée résiduelle n'est pas  Creditors : amounts becoming due and 
supérieure à un an payable within one year
F.2 Dettes envers des établissements de crédit Amounts owed to credit institutions
F.3 Acomptes reçus sur commandes Payments received on accounts of orders
F.4 Dettes sur achats et prestations de services Trade creditors
         F.10* Autres dettes Other creditors
           F.101* Autres dettes financières Other financial creditors
           F.102* Autres dettes non financières Other non financial creditors
I. Dettes dont la durée résiduelle est supérieure Creditors : amounts becoming due and 
à un an payable after more than one year
I.1 Emprunts obligataires Debenture loans
I.2 Dettes envers des établissements de crédit Amounts owed to credit institutions
I.4 Dettes sur achats et prestations de services Trade creditors
         I.10* Autres dettes Other creditors
           I.101* Autres dettes financières Other financial creditors
           I.102* Autres dettes non financières Other non financial creditors
J. Provisions pour risques et charges Provisions for liabilities and charges
J.1* Provisions pour fonds de pension et oblig. similaires Provisions for pensions and similar obligations
J.4* Autres provisions Other provisions
K. Comptes de régularisation  Accruals and deferred income
L. Capitaux propres Capital and reserves
L.1 Capital souscrit Subscribed capital
L.2 Primes d'émission Share premium account
L.3 Réserve de réévaluation Revaluation reserve
L.4 Réserves Reserves
L.5 Résultats reportés  Profit or loss brought forward
L.6 Résultat de l'exercice Profit or loss for the financial year
FL* Total du passif Total liabilities
(*) Non conforme à la 4ème directive / Not in conformity with the 4th directive.
BILAN - PASSIF BALANCE SHEET - LIABILITIES 
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Code Intitulé Description
1. Montant net du chiffre d'affaires  Net turnover
2. Variation du stock produits finis et en cours fabrication Variation in stocks finished goods and work in progr.
3. Travaux portés à l'actif  Capitalised production
4. Autres produits d'exploitation  Other operating income
S.* Produits d'exploitation Total operating income
5. Consommation de biens et de services Costs of materials and consumables
5.a Charges des matières premières et consommables  Raw materials and consumables
5.b Autres charges externes  Other external charges
8. Autres charges et impôts d'exploitation Other operating charges and taxes
T.* Valeur ajoutée BACH ( S - 5 - 8 ) Added value BACH ( S - 5 - 8 )
6. Frais de personnel Staff costs
6.a Salaires et traitements Wages and salaries
6.b Charges sociales Social security costs
U.* Résultat brut d'exploitation (T - 6) Gross operating profit (T - 6)
7. Corrections de valeur sur actifs non financiers Value adjustments on non financial assets
7.a Amortissements sur immob. incorporelles et corporelles Depreciation on intangible and tangible fixed assets
 7.c* Autres corrections de valeur et provisions Other value adjustments and provisions
V.* Résultat net d'exploitation ( U - 7  ) Net operating profit ( U - 7 )
 9/11 Produits financiers Financial income
12. Corrections de valeur sur actifs financiers Value adjustements on financial assets
13. Intérêts et charges similaires Interest and similar charges
13.a* Intérêts versés sur dettes financières Interest paid on financial debts
13.b* Autres charges financières Other financial charges
W.* Résultat financier Financial income net of charges
X.* Résultat net des activités ordinaires avant impôts Profit or loss on ordinary activities before taxes
16. Produits exceptionnels Extraordinary income
17. Charges exceptionnelles Extraordinary charges
Y. Impôts sur les résultats Taxes on profits
21. Résultat net après impôts Profit or loss for the financial year
COMPTE DE RESULTATS PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 
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 - Etat des investissements -  - Statement of  investment -
251.* Acquisitions d'immobilisations incorporelles Acquisitions of intangible fixed assets
252.* Cessions d'immobilisations incorporelles Sales and disposals of intangible fixed assets
253.* Acquisitions - cessions Acquisitions - sales and disposals
261.* Acquisitions d'immobilisations corporelles Acquisitions of tangible fixed assets
262.* Cessions d'immobilisations corporelles Sales and disposals of tangible fixed assets
263.* Acquisitions - cessions Acquisitions - sales and disposals
271.* Acquisitions d'immobilisations financières Acquisitions of financial fixed assets
272.* Cessions d'immobilisations financières Sales and diposals of financial fixed assets
273.* Acquisitions - cessions Acquisitions - sales and disposals
 - Etat des amortissements -  - Statement of depreciation -
28.* Amortissements cumulés sur immob. incorporelles Accumulated depreciation on intangible assets
29.* Amortissements cumulés sur immob. corporelles Accumulated depreciation on tangible assets
30.* Amortissements cumulés sur immob. financières Accumulated depreciation on financial assets
311.* Bénéfices distribués pour l'exercice clôturé Distribution of profit for the current year
312.* Bénéfices distribués pour l'exercice précédent Distribution of profit for the previous year
32.* Nombre d'entreprises Number of enterprises
(*) Non conforme à la 4ème directive / Not in conformity with the 4th directive.
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1. DETAILED CALCULATION OF RATIOS BY COUNTRY OR BY GROUP OF 
COUNTRIES  
 
List of ratios calculated for European countries 
 
Indicators of financial structures: 
-  financial fixed assets / fixed assets = C3/C 
-  financial debt / balance-sheet total = F2+F101+I4+I2+I101/balance-sheet total 
-  own funds = capital and reserves / balance-sheet total = L/FL 
-  reserves rate = reserves / capital and reserves = (L3+L4+L5+L6) / L 
-  leverage = provisions and medium- and long-term liabilities / (provisions and medium- and long-
term liabilities + capital and reserves) = (J+I101+I2+I1)/ (L-A+I1+I2+I1O1+J) 
-  short-term financial debt over turnover = (F2+F101) / 1 
-  cover rate of capital employed =(capital and reserves + medium- and long-term debt)/fixed 
assets + working capital requirement + other current non-financial items = (L-A+I1+I2+I101+J 
) / [(C+D1+D2+E) - (F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K)] 
-  liquid capital requirement / turnover =[(fixed assets + working capital requirement +  
-  other current non-financial items) - (provisions and medium- and long-term liabilities + capital 
and reserves)] / turnover = [ C+D1+D2+E  - (F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K)  - (L-
A+I1+I2+I1O1+J)] / 1 
-  financial debt structure = financial short-term debt/total financial debt = ( F2+F101) / 
(F2+F101+I1+I2+I1O1) 
-  provisions over own funds = J/L  
 
Indicators of profitability: 
-  cash-flow capacity = cash flow/ turnover = (T-6+W-Y) / 1 
-  working capital requirement over turnover = [(D1+D2.1+E-(F3+F4+I4)] / 1 
-  gross profitability = gross operating profit / capital employed =  T-6/ [C+D1+D2+E  - 
(F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K]) 
-  value added over capital employed = T/[C+D1+D2+E-(F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K)] 
-  fixed assets over turnover = C/1 
-  value added over turnover = T/1 
-  costs of materials and consumables over turnover = 5/1 
-  mark-up ratio = T-6/1 
-  staff costs = 6/1 
-  stocks over turnover =D.1/1  
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List of ratios calculated for the US 
 
Indicators of financial structures: 
-  own funds = capital and reserves / balance-sheet total (L/FL) 
-  financial debt structure = financial short-term debt/total financial debt 
(F2/F2+I2+I10
19) 
-  cover rate of capital employed = (capital and reserves + medium - and long-term debt) / fixed 
assets + working capital requirement 
[L+I10+I2+J/ C+D1+D2.1-(F3+F4
20)] 
-  liquid capital requirement / turnover =[(fixed assets + working capital requirement) – (provisions 
and medium- and long-term liabilities + capital and reserves)] / turnover 
[C+D1+D2.1-(F3+F4
2)-(L+I10+I2+J)] / 1 
 
Indicators and determinants of profitability: 
-  fixed assets over turnover (C/1) 
-  working capital requirement over turnover [D1+D2.1+ E - (F3+F4
2 + K)]/1 
Capital structure and capital requirement: 
-  provisions over own funds (J/L) 
-  financial charges over turnover (13/1) 
-  trade creditors over turnover (F3+F4/1) 
-  current assets over non-financial debt (D1+D2/F3+F4
2) 
-  short-term financial debt over turnover (F2/1) 
-  working capital requirement + current investments & cash over financial short-term loans 
[D1+D2-(F3+F4)+D3+D4/F2] 
                                                 
19   I10 is chosen as a substitute for I1. 
The main consequence is that the only item taken into account is “debenture and other fixed-interest-rate instruments in 
circulation”; the item “participating loans” is not included under I10. 
20   F4 is chosen as a sustitute for I4. 
The main consequence is that the only item taken into account is “ trade creditors ” ; the item “ payment received on 





2. VARIABLES AVAILABLE AND MISSING IN THE REPORT FOR EACH COUNTRY  
 

















               
Current investments 
(D3)  X 
(in 90 and 
91) 
             
Cash at bank and in hand 
(D4) 
               
Prepayments and accrued income 
 (E)  X 
           
X 
Amounts owed to credit institutions  
(due and payable within one year) 
(F2) 
               
Payments received on account of  
orders (due and payable within one 
year) 
(F3) 




Trade creditors(due and payable  
within one year) 
(F4) 
               
Other financial creditors (due and  
payable within one year) 
 (F101) 
X 
             
Other non-financial creditors (due 
and payable within one year) 
 (F102) 
X 
   
X 
       
Debenture loans 
(I1) 
               
Amount owed to credit institutions 
(due  
and payable after more than one year) 
(I2) 
               
Trade creditors (due and payable  































SPAIN  JAPAN 
Other financial creditors (due and 
payable after more than one year) 
(I101) 
X              X 
Other non-financial creditors (due  
and payable after more than one year) 
 (I102) 
X      X        X 
Accruals and deferred income 
(K)  X               
Revaluation reserves  
(L3)   X      X        X 
Reserves 
(L4)                  
Profit or loss brought forward  
(L5)           X       





             
Added value BACH 
(T)                 
Staff costs 
(6)                 
Interest paid on financial debts  
(13a)  X          X     
Note: X denotes missing item. 
 
The main consequences of these items being missing are:  
 
-  the impossibility of calculating the variable “ apparent interest rate on financial debt ” for Portugal and Austria; 
-  an undervaluation for the variable “ reserve rate ” for Austria, Germany and Japan;  
-  an undervaluation for all the variables which included the items “ other financial and non-financial creditors ” for Austria; 
-  an undervaluation for all the variables which included the item “ other non-financial creditors ” for Germany; 
-  an undervaluation for all the variables which included the item “other financial or non-financial creditors due and payable 
after more than one year” for Japan.  
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Table of missing Bach items for the United States 



















Amounts owed to credit institutions  
(due and payable within one year) 
(F2) 
 
Payments received on account of orders  
(due and payable within one year) 
(F3) 
 
Trade creditors (due and payable  
within one year) 
(F4) 
 




Other non-financial creditors (due and  







(included in I10) 
Amount owed to credit institutions (due  
and payable after more than one year) 
(I2) 
 
Trade creditors (due and payable after  
more than one year) 
(I4) 
X 
(included in F4) 
Note: X denotes missing item. 
   
US 
 
Other financial creditors (due and payable  
after more than one year) 
(I101) 
X 
Other non-financial creditors (due and payable  
after more than one year) 
(I102) 
X 






































Table of missing Bach items for countries excluded from our analysis 











X     
Cash at bank and in hand 
(D4) 
 
X     
Prepayments and accrued income 
 (E) 
 
X  X   
Amounts owed to credit institutions  
(due and payable within one year) 
(F2) 
X     
Payments received on account of orders  
(due and payable within one year) 
(F3) 
X     
Trade creditors (due and payable  
within one year) 
(F4) 
X     
Other financial creditors (due and  
payable within one year) 
 (F101) 
X  X   
Other non-financial creditors (due and 
payable within one year) 
 (F102) 




X    X 
Amount owed to credit institutions (due  
and payable after more than one year) 
 (I2) 
X    X 
Trade creditors (due and payable after  
more than one year) 
 (I4) 




DENMARK  NETHERLANDS  SWEDEN 
Other financial creditors (due and payable  
after more than one year) 
 (I101) 
X  X  X 
Other non-financial creditors (due and  
payable after more than one year) 
 (I102) 
X    X 
Accruals and deferred income 
(K) 
 




X     
Share premium account 
(L2) 
 
X    X 
Revaluation reserves  
(L3)  
 




X     
Profit or loss brought forward  
(L5)  
 
X  X   
Profit or loss for the financial year 
(L6)  
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Added value BACH 
(T) 
 




     
Interest paid on financial debts  
(13a) 
 
X      
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3. COMMENT CONCERNING THE UNITED KINGDOM  
 
Given the limits of the sample, which is not included in the BACH database, the analysis of UK 
SMEs cannot yield reliable results. First, only a few ratios can be estimated as many items are 
missing. Second, the representativeness of SMEs is very low and the sample is not constant, so that 
the inclusion of some new firms may introduce erratic changes from one year to the next. Third, the 
estimated value of some ratios may be abnormal (for instance, the cash flow capacity gives –90% in 
1994 for SMEs). Finally, differences between medium-sized and large firms tend to be very small or 
non-existent. Hence, only one ratio is commented on in this study. The own funds ratio tends to 
decrease with size and small firms in the United Kingdom seem to be highly capitalised. 
 











1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
SEs MEs LEs   
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1. LIST OF RATIOS USED IN THE DATA  
 
Active variables following the Bach scheme 
-  ‘own funds’ = capital and reserves / balance-sheet total = L / FL 
-  ‘leverage’ = provisions and medium- and long-term liabilities / (provisions and medium- and 
long-term liabilities + capital and reserves) =   
(J+I101+I2+I1) / (L-A+I1+I2+I1O1+J) 
-  ‘reserve rate’ = reserves / capital and reserves = (L3+L4+L5+L6) / L 
-  ‘financial debt structure’ = financial short-term debt/total financial debt =  
(F2+F101) / ( F2+F101+I1+I2+I1O1) 
-  ‘cover rate of capital employed’ = (capital and reserves +medium- and long-term debt)/ fixed 
assets + working capital requirement + other non-financial current items =  
(L-A+I1+I2+I101+J) / [(C+D1+D2+E) - (F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K)] 
-  ‘liquid capital requirement’ / turnover =[(fixed assets + working capital requirement + other non-
financial current items ) – (provisions and medium- and long-term liabilities + capital and 
reserves)] / turnover = 
[( C+D1+D2+E - (F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K) - (L-A+I1+I2+I1O1+J) ] / 1 
-  ‘cash flow capacity’ = cash flow/ turnover = (T-6+W-Y) / 1 
-  leverage impact = financial profitability less gross profitability = (cash flow / capital and reserves) 
- (gross operating profit over capital employed) = 
[T-6+W-Y/L] – [T-6 / (C+D1+D2+E) - (F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K)] 
 
 
Supplementary variables following the Bach scheme 
Indicators and determinants of profitability: 
-  gross profitability = gross operating profit / capital employed = 
(T-6) / [ (C+D1+D2+E) - (F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K)] 
-  profitability of own funds = profit or loss on ordinary activities after taxes / capital and reserves = 
(T-6-7+W-Y) / L 
-  mark-up ratio = (T-6) / 1 
-  fixed assets over turnover = C / 1 
-  working capital requirement and other current non-financial items over turnover = 
[(D1+D2+E)-(F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K)]/1 
-  financial charges over turnover =13 / 1 
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Financial structure and capital requirement: 
-  provisions over own funds = J / L 
-  solvency = cash flow/financial debt = (T-6-7+W-Y) / ( F2+F101+I1+I2+I1O1) 
-  trade creditors over turnover = (F3+F4) / 1 
-  current assets over non-financial debt = (D1+D2+E) / (F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K) 
-  short-term financial debt over turnover = (F2+F101) / 1 
-  working capital requirement + current investments and cash over financial short-term loans = 
[(D1+D2+E) -(F3+F4+F102+I4+I102+K)+D3+D4 ] / (F2+F101)  
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2. SOME DETAILS OF THE DATA  
 
Contents of cluster according to size 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4 
SMALL  39  28  40  55 
MEDIUM  7  58  55  42 
LARGE  0  68  42  52 
ALL SIZES  46  154  137  149 
 
The firms which contribute most to the definition of the components are: 
 
-  on the negative part of the first component: almost only small companies 
-  on the positive part of the first component: all sizes 
-  on the negative part of the second component: mainly small companies 
-  on the positive part of the second component: all sizes, with a majority of medium-sized companies.  
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Principal component analysis 
 
 
ACTIVE AND SUPPLEMENTARY VARIABLES (mean and standard deviation) 
 
 
TOTAL NUMBER  : 486              TOTAL WEIGHT : 486.00 
+-------------------------------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------| 
| NUM . IDEN - NAME                     SIZE    WEIGHT  |     MEAN   STANDARD  |   MINIMUM   MAXIMUM  | 
|                                                       |            DEVIATION |                      | 
|                                                       |                                             | 
+-------------------------------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------- 
|   1 . PDSK - own funds/total          486     486.00  |     32.81      9.98  |      8.16     66.36  | 
|   2 . TXEN - leverage                 486     486.00  |     39.62     14.08  |      6.48     79.12  | 
|   3 . TXRE - reserves rate            486     486.00  |     49.52     19.18  |      0.00     89.53  | 
|   4 . TXCO - cover rate of K. emp     486     486.00  |     86.61     15.86  |     42.46    141.24  | 
|   5 . BESL - liquid capital requi     486     486.00  |      8.07      9.26  |    -17.43     43.48  | 
|   6 . CAFC - cash flow capacity       486     486.00  |      6.25      2.39  |     -5.19     18.37  | 
|   7 . RFIM – leverage impact          486     486.00  |      6.29     13.49  |    -14.56     89.75  | 
|   8 . DFIC - short term fin.debt/     486     486.00  |     52.12     15.08  |     11.82     82.31  | 
|-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------- 
|   9 . PROV - provisions/own funds     486     486.00  |     17.19     15.34  |      0.37     61.25  | 
|  10 . SOLV - solvency                 486     486.00  |     23.07     13.77  |    -14.36    155.94  | 
|  11 . ACTC - current assets /std      486     486.00  |      2.13      1.08  |      1.10      7.42  | 
|  12 . LIQU - wcr+current invest&c     486     486.00  |      2.37      1.34  |      0.72      8.98  | 
|  13 . CBCC - sh fin. debt/t.o.        486     486.00  |     13.58      5.67  |      3.11     35.68  | 
|  14 . RBE  - gross profit/capital     486     486.00  |     18.87      4.93  |      3.53     38.46  | 
|  15 . RESU - profit/own funds         486     486.00  |      4.67      6.91  |    -40.06     26.45  | 
|  16 . EBEC - mark-up                  486     486.00  |      9.92      2.59  |      2.10     24.48  | 
|  17 . FRSF – fin. charges/t.o.        486     486.00  |      3.65      1.40  |      1.51      9.16  | 
|  18 . AICC - fixed assets/t.o.        486     486.00  |     35.82     14.91  |     12.63     97.35  | 
|  19 . BFRC - working cap. requi       486     486.00  |     19.49      8.02  |      3.14     45.75  | 





CORRELATION  MATRIX 
     |   PDSK   TXEN   TXRE   TXCO   BESL   CAFC   RFIM   DFIC-----+-----------------------
---------------------------------PDSK |   1.00TXEN |  -0.85   1.00TXRE |   0.18  -0.14   
1.00 
TXCO |   0.52  -0.38   0.43   1.00 
BESL |  -0.42   0.30  -0.42  -0.95   1.00 
CAFC |   0.47  -0.21   0.02   0.15  -0.08   1.00 
RFIM |  -0.62   0.74  -0.40  -0.59   0.49   0.14   1.00 
DFIC |  -0.24   0.04  -0.28  -0.71   0.65  -0.26   0.20   1.00 
-----+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     |   PDSK   TXEN   TXRE   TXCO   BESL   CAFC   RFIM   DFIC 
 
 
EIGENVALUES OF THE CORRELATION MATRIX 
     |   PDSK   TXEN   TXRE   TXCO   BESL   CAFC   RFIM   DFIC-----+-----------------------
--------------------------------- 
PDSK |  99.99 
TXEN | -27.83  99.99 
TXRE |   3.96  -3.20  99.99 
TXCO |  12.83  -8.87  10.11  99.99 
BESL |  -9.83   6.86  -9.81 -40.01  99.99 
CAFC |  11.28  -4.77   0.52   3.24  -1.67  99.99 
RFIM | -15.97  20.80  -9.43 -14.94  11.83   3.04  99.99 
DFIC |  -5.47   0.87  -6.39 -19.63  17.08  -5.75   4.52  99.99 
-----+-------------------------------------------------------- 








+| No     | EIGENVALUE |     %    | CUMULA.  |                                                                                  
| 
|        |            |          |    %     |                                                                                  | 
+--------+------------+----------+----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
|    1   |   3.8845   |   48.56  |   48.56  | ******************************************************************************** | 
|    2   |   1.5721   |   19.65  |   68.21  | *********************************                                                | 
|    3   |   1.2489   |   15.61  |   83.82  | **************************                                                       | 
|    4   |   0.7333   |    9.17  |   92.98  | ****************                                                                 | 
|    5   |   0.3012   |    3.77  |   96.75  | *******                                                                          | 
|    6   |   0.1400   |    1.75  |   98.50  | ***                                                                              | 
|    7   |   0.0914   |    1.14  |   99.64  | **                                                                               | 






CONFIDENCE = 0.95 
+--------+--------------------------------------------------------+ 
| NUMBER | LOWER CONFIDENCE     EIGENVALUE      UPPER CONFIDENCE  | 
|        |      LIMIT                                 LIMIT       |+--------+--------------
------------------------------------------+|    1   |      3.4251             3.8845             
4.4055      | 
|    2   |      1.3862             1.5721             1.7830      | 
|    3   |      1.1012             1.2489             1.4164      | 
|    4   |      0.6465             0.7333             0.8316      | 




POSITION OF INTERVALS 
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .*-------------+--------------
--* 
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . *-----+-----* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . 
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . .*----+----*. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . 
4 . . . . . .*--+--*. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . 




VARIABLE COORDINATES ON COMPONENTS  1 TO 5 
ACTIVE VARIABLES  ----------------------------+------------------------------------+--------




IDEN – NAME                 |    1      2      3      4      5   |    1     2     3     4     
5  | 
PDSK - own funds/total      |   0.78   0.54  -0.21  -0.01   0.01 |  0.78  0.54 -0.21 -0.01  
0.01 | 
TXEN - leverage             |  -0.69  -0.68  -0.10   0.05   0.05 | -0.69 -0.68 -0.10  0.05  
0.05 | 
TXRE - reserves rate        |   0.51  -0.30   0.27   0.76  -0.01 |  0.51 -0.30  0.27  0.76 
-0.01 | 
TXCO - cover rate of K.emp  |   0.90  -0.34  -0.01  -0.16   0.14 |  0.90 -0.34 -0.01 -0.16  
0.14 | 
BESL - liquid capital requi |  -0.83   0.42  -0.03   0.18  -0.30 | -0.83  0.42 -0.03  0.18 
-0.30 | 
CAFC - cash flow capacity/  |   0.27   0.22  -0.88   0.27   0.06 |  0.27  0.22 -0.88  0.27  
0.06 | 
RFIM – leverage impact      |  -0.77  -0.28  -0.48   0.03   0.16 | -0.77 -0.28 -0.48  0.03  
0.16 | 











IDEN – NAME                 |    1      2      3      4      5   |    1     2     3     4     
5  | 
----------------------------+------------------------------------+-------------------------
------+ 
PROV - provisions/own funds |  -0.77  -0.26  -0.16   0.14   0.31 | -0.77 -0.26 -0.16  0.14  
0.31 | 
SOLV - solvency             |   0.39   0.28  -0.67   0.25   0.17 |  0.39  0.28 -0.67  0.25  
0.17 | 
ACTC - current assets /std  |  -0.49   0.07  -0.27   0.31   0.11 | -0.49  0.07 -0.27  0.31  
0.11 | 
LIQU - wcr+current invest&c |   0.42  -0.38  -0.30   0.05  -0.08 |  0.42 -0.38 -0.30  0.05 
-0.08 | 
CBCC - sh fin. debt/t.o.    |  -0.62   0.44   0.33   0.01  -0.09 | -0.62  0.44  0.33  0.01 
-0.09 | 
RBE  - gross profit/capital |   0.34  -0.37  -0.17   0.11   0.14 |  0.34 -0.37 -0.17  0.11  
0.14 | 
RESU - profit/own funds     |  -0.06  -0.26  -0.57   0.47   0.27 | -0.06 -0.26 -0.57  0.47  
0.27 | 
EBEC - mark-up              |   0.26   0.37  -0.60   0.25  -0.10 |  0.26  0.37 -0.60  0.25 
-0.10 | 
FRSF – fin. charges/t.o.    |   0.07   0.41   0.27  -0.17  -0.34 |  0.07  0.41  0.27 -0.17 
-0.34 | 
AICC - fixed assets/t.o.    |   0.21   0.41  -0.29  -0.04  -0.31 |  0.21  0.41 -0.29 -0.04 
-0.31 | 
BFRC - working cap. require |  -0.50   0.40  -0.10   0.30  -0.06 | -0.50  0.40 -0.10  0.30 
-0.06 | 







CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPONENT 1  
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+| COORD. 
|  WEIGHT   |                         DESIGNATION                          |  AVERAGE  |STANDARD DEV|    NO  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|  -0.83 |    486.00 | liquid capital requirement/turnover                          |      8.07 |      9.26  |     1  | 
|  -0.77 |    486.00 | provisions/own funds                                         |     17.19 |     15.34  |     2  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|                                             
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|   0.78 |    486.00 | own funds/balance sheet total                                |     32.81 |      9.98  |    19  | 




| COORD. |  WEIGHT   |                         DESIGNATION                          |  AVERAGE  |STANDARD DEV|    NO  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 




|   0.42 |    486.00 | wcr+current invest&cash/st fin. debt                         |      2.37 |      1.34  |    12  | 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPONENT 2  
 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| COORD. |  WEIGHT   |                         DESIGNATION                          |  AVERAGE  |STANDARD DEV|    NO  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|  -0.68 |    486.00 | leverage                                                     |     39.62 |     14.08  |     1  | 




|   0.54 |    486.00 | own funds/balance sheet total                                |     32.81 |      9.98  |    19  | 




| COORD. |  WEIGHT   |                          DESIGNATION                         |  AVERAGE  |STANDARD DEV|    NO  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 




|   0.44 |    486.00 | sh financial debt/turnover                                   |     13.58 |      5.67  |    12  | 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPONENT 3 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+| COORD. 
|  WEIGHT   |                          DESIGNATION                         |  AVERAGE  |STANDARD DEV|     NO | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 
|  -0.88 |    486.00 | cash flow capacity/turnover                                  |      6.25 |      2.39  |     1  | 




|   0.33 |    486.00 | short term fin.debt/financial debt                           |     52.12 |     15.08  |    19  | 
|   0.42 |    486.00 | trade creditors/turnover                                     |     16.41 |      5.33  |    20  | 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
BY ILLUSTRATIVE CONTINUOUS VARIABLES      
+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| COORD. |  WEIGHT   |                          DESIGNATION                         |  AVERAGE  |STANDARD DEV|    NO  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| 










DESCRIPTION OF PARTITIONS 
DESCRIPTION FROM THE CUT  'a' OF THE TREE IN 4 CLUSTERS 
 
 
CLUSTER  1 /  4 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------
-+ 
| V.TEST | PROBA |       MEAN        |STANDARD DEVIATION |                 VARIABLES                                             
| 




|                          CLUSTER 1 /  4       ( WEIGHT = 46.00      SIZE =   46 )                         
| 
|                                                                                                                                
| 
|  16.91 | 0.000 |    38.34     6.29 |    15.55    13.49 |   7.leverage impact                        
RFIM | 
|  12.43 | 0.000 |    64.21    39.62 |     7.64    14.08 |   2.leverage                                                     TXEN 
| 
|  11.27 | 0.000 |    41.49    17.19 |     7.48    15.34 |   9.provisions/own funds                                         PROV 
| 
|   9.10 | 0.000 |    19.91     8.07 |     8.16     9.26 |   5.liquid capital requirement / turnover                        BESL 
| 
|   5.82 | 0.000 |     3.01     2.13 |     0.38     1.08 |  11.current assets /st non fin. debt                             ACTC 
| 
|   5.43 | 0.000 |    17.90    13.58 |     2.63     5.67 |  13.sh financial debt/turnover                                   CBCC 
| 
|   4.63 | 0.000 |     9.16     4.67 |     6.79     6.91 |  15.profit/own funds                                             RESU 
| 
|   3.92 | 0.000 |    60.42    52.12 |     4.43    15.08 |   8.short term fin.debt/financial debt                           DFIC 
| 
|   3.44 | 0.000 |    23.36    19.49 |     3.98     8.02 |  19.working cap. requirement(wcr)/turnover                       BFRC 
| 
|        |       |                   |                   |                                                                       
| 
|  -3.63 | 0.000 |     2.93     3.65 |     0.66     1.40 |  17.financial charges/turnover                                   FRSF 
| 
|  -3.93 | 0.000 |    27.60    35.82 |    11.92    14.91 |  18.fixed assets/turnover                                        AICC 
| 
|  -4.04 | 0.000 |     1.61     2.37 |     0.31     1.34 |  12.wcr+current invest&cash/st fin. debt                         LIQU 
| 
|  -4.58 | 0.000 |    14.22    23.07 |     6.17    13.77 |  10.solvency                                                     SOLV 
| 
|  -6.00 | 0.000 |    11.92    16.41 |     2.40     5.33 |  20.trade creditors/turnover                                     DETT 
| 
| -10.69 | 0.000 |    20.73    49.52 |    19.74    19.18 |   3.reserves rate                                                TXRE 
| 
| -11.08 | 0.000 |    61.94    86.61 |     7.86    15.86 |   4.cover rate of capital employed                               TXCO 
| 










| V.TEST | PROBA |       MEAN        |STANDARD DEVIATION |                 VARIABLES                                             
| 




|                          CLUSTER  2 /  4       ( WEIGHT =   154.00      SIZE =  154 )                                     aa2a 
| 
|                                                                                                                                
| 
|  11.99 | 0.000 |    25.90    19.49 |     6.58     8.02 |  19.working cap. requirement(wcr)/turnover                       BFRC 
| 
|  11.60 | 0.000 |    63.77    52.12 |     7.64    15.08 |   8.short term fin.debt/financial debt                           DFIC 
| 
|  11.31 | 0.000 |    15.06     8.07 |     5.92     9.26 |   5.liquid capital requirement / turnover                        BESL 
| 
|  10.93 | 0.000 |    28.38    17.19 |    13.67    15.34 |   9.provisions/own funds                                         PROV 
| 
|  10.18 | 0.000 |     2.86     2.13 |     1.47     1.08 |  11. current assets /st non fin. debt                            ACTC 
| 
|   9.27 | 0.000 |    17.09    13.58 |     5.50     5.67 |  13.sh financial debt/turnover                                   CBCC 
| 
|   5.43 | 0.000 |    44.72    39.62 |     8.14    14.08 |   2.leverage                                                     TXEN 
| 
|        |       |                   |                   |                                                                       
| 
|  -2.53 | 0.006 |    46.28    49.52 |    16.80    19.18 |   3.reserves rate                                                TXRE 
| 
|  -2.69 | 0.004 |    20.60    23.07 |    12.21    13.77 |  10.solvency                                                     SOLV 
| 
|  -3.33 | 0.000 |     2.07     2.37 |     0.99     1.34 |  12.wcr+current invest&cash/st fin. debt                         LIQU 
| 
|  -3.98 | 0.000 |     5.62     6.25 |     2.38     2.39 |   6.cash flow capacity / turnover                                CAFC 
| 
|  -4.06 | 0.000 |     9.22     9.92 |     2.00     2.59 |  16.mark-up                                                      EBEC 
| 
|  -6.86 | 0.000 |    28.24    32.81 |     4.61     9.98 |   1.own funds/ balance sheet total                               PDSK 
| 
|  -9.40 | 0.000 |    15.78    18.87 |     3.99     4.93 |  14.gross profit/capital employed                                RBE  
| 






CLUSTER  3 /  4 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------
-+ 
| V.TEST | PROBA |       MEAN        |STANDARD DEVIATION |                 V ARIABLES                                             
|  
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|        |       |  CLUSTER  GENERAL |CLUSTER    GENERAL |                                                                  IDEN 
| 




|                 CLUSTER  3 /  4       ( WEIGHT =   137.00      SIZE =  137 )                                              aa3a 
| 
|                                                                                                                                
| 
|  14.38 | 0.000 |    43.21    32.81 |     6.67     9.98 |   1.own funds/ balance sheet total                               PDSK 
| 
|   8.35 | 0.000 |     4.49     3.65 |     1.54     1.40 |  17.financial charges/turnover                                   FRSF 
| 
|   7.59 | 0.000 |    44.02    35.82 |    17.28    14.91 |  18.fixed assets/turnover                                        AICC 
| 
|   7.47 | 0.000 |    11.33     9.92 |     3.50     2.59 |  16.mark-up                                                      EBEC 
| 
|   6.69 | 0.000 |    29.75    23.07 |    17.70    13.77 |  10.solvency                                                     SOLV 
| 
|   5.78 | 0.000 |     7.25     6.25 |     2.82     2.39 |   6.cash flow capacity / turnover                                CAFC 
| 
|   2.37 | 0.009 |    89.33    86.61 |     6.31    15.86 |   4.cover rate of capital employed                               TXCO 
| 
|   2.37 | 0.009 |    54.70    52.12 |    11.28    15.08 |   8.short term fin.debt/financial debt                           DFIC 
| 
|        |       |                   |                   |                                                                       
| 
|  -3.51 | 0.000 |     2.91     4.67 |     4.63     6.91 |  15.profit/own funds                                             RESU 
| 
|  -4.20 | 0.000 |     1.96     2.37 |     0.51     1.34 |  12.wcr+current invest&cash/st fin. debt                         LIQU 
| 
|  -5.27 | 0.000 |     1.72     2.13 |     0.28     1.08 |  11.current assets /st non fin. debt                             ACTC 
| 
|  -7.63 | 0.000 |    -1.17     6.29 |     3.39    13.49 |   7.leverage impact                                              RFIM 
| 
| -11.81 | 0.000 |     4.06    17.19 |     3.37    15.34 |   9.provisions/own funds                                         PROV 
| 







CLUSTER  4 /  4 
+--------+-------+-------------------+-------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------
-+| V.TEST | PROBA |       MEAN        |STANDARD DEVIATION |                 VARIABLES                                 
| 
|        |       |  CLUSTER  GENERAL |CLUSTER    GENERAL |                                                                  IDEN 
| 




|                 CLUSTER  4 /  4       ( POIDS =   149.00      EFFECTIF =  149 )                                           aa4a 
| 
|                                                                                                                                
| 
|  15.49 | 0.000 |   103.38    86.61 |     9.85    15.86 |   4.cover rate of capital employed                               TXCO 
| 
|  10.70 | 0.000 |    22.48    18.87 |     4.91     4.93 |  14.gross profit/capital employed                                RBE  
| 
|  10.02 | 0.000 |     3.28     2.37 |     1.81     1.34 |  12.wcr+current invest&cash/st fin. debt                         LIQU 
| 
|   9.62 | 0.000 |    62.13    49.52 |    15.42    19.18 |   3.reserves rate                                                TXRE 
| 
|   2.82 | 0.002 |     6.00     4.67 |     4.34     6.91 |  15.profit/own funds                                             RESU 
| 
|        |       |                   |                   |                                                                       
| 
|  -2.36 | 0.009 |     9.51     9.92 |     1.64     2.59 |  16.mark-up                                                      EBEC 
| 
|  -3.88 | 0.000 |    31.87    35.82 |    12.12    14.91 |  18.fixed assets/turnover                                        AICC 
| 
|  -5.00 | 0.000 |     3.17     3.65 |     0.93     1.40 |  17.financial charges/turnover                                   FRSF 
| 
|  -5.50 | 0.000 |     1.22     6.29 |     4.97    13.49 |   7. leverage impact                                             RFIM 
| 
|  -6.67 | 0.000 |    10.20    17.19 |     5.31    15.34 |   9.provisions/own funds                                         PROV 
| 
|  -8.81 | 0.000 |     1.48     2.13 |     0.23     1.08 |  11. current assets /st non fin. debt                            ACTC 
| 
| -12.66 | 0.000 |     8.69    13.58 |     4.18     5.67 |  13.sh financial debt/turnover                                   CBCC 
| 
| -13.25 | 0.000 |    12.24    19.49 |     5.21     8.02 |  19.working cap. requirement(wcr)/turnover                       BFRC 
| 
| -15.19 | 0.000 |    -1.54     8.07 |     4.52     9.26 |   5.liquid capital requirement / turnover                        BESL 
| 
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1. ESTIMATION METHOD  
 
Estimation was carried out in three stages. 
Stage one 
This serves to initialise the iteration procedure. Equations (4) and (5) are estimated independently 
for each size class, and from this the initial values for coefficients a, d, b, d, e and j are deduced for each 
class. 
The mean values are calculated for all classes b1, e1 and j1 (1 for the first estimation). 
Stage two 
The purpose of this stage is to start out from the assumption that b, d, e and j are identical in all 
the size classes and to obtain by iteration a convergent estimation of parameters a, d, b, e,  
         ^   ^   ^  ^        ^ 
and j , or ai, di, b, j and e. 
This was done using equations (4) and (5), slightly modified as follows: 
(4')  (R - VA) = b  K 
   âi    SC  N 
 
(5')  R - GP =   e         TO +  j  WCR 
    di    TO       K     TO 
 
The iteration was carried out as follows: 
 
    Input          Estimation 
  
b1, e1, j1 
^    ^ 
ai1, di1 
in (4) and (5) by size class   
   
^  ^ 
ai1, di1 
 
b2, e2, j2 
in (4') and (5') for all classes   
   
 
b2, e2, j2 
^    ^ 
ai2, di2 
in (4) and (5) by size class   
   
^  ^ 
ai2, di2 
 
b3, e3, j3 
in (4') and (5') for all classes   
 
and so on, continuing until the estimations converged.  
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The required number of iterations is indicated in the tables. 
 
Stage three 
                            ^        ^ 
Once convergence has been obtained, and with the values for RM and RO for each observation as 
derived from equations (4) and (5), we return to equation (3): 
    ^    ^ 
R = pM RM+ pO RO, 
 to estimate parameters pM and pO by class. 
 
This method of estimation appears robust, despite its “rule of thumb” character. 
If we term ej, eOj and eMj (j is the observation index) the random variables of equations (3), (4) and 
(5) respectively, this method amounts to assuming that the random variables are linked by the following 
relation: 
(6)  ej = pO eOj + pM eMj + hj 
 
in which: 
- hj is a random variable providing a measure of the residual variability of ej, once that of eOj and 
eMj has been taken into account, 
- variables eOj, eMj and hj are independent. 
 
These assumptions flow naturally from our theoretical model for the formation of profitability.  
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2. MEANS VALUES OF THE DETERMINANTS OF PROFIT  
 
Explanation of the following tables 
 
The tables display the mean values per size of enterprises for the ratios which influence the formation of 
profitability.  
The results are displayed for manufacturing as a whole and then the results are broken down by subsector, 
namely : ‘intermediate product’, ‘investment goods and consumer durables’ and ‘non-durable consumption 
goods’. 
The significance of the difference of mean value is econometrically tested. An asterix means that the 
difference is significant with an confidence interval of 95%.  
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Summary of results for Austria 
 
Overall results (for all sectors) 
  Organisation  Market 
 
All sectors 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




               
Small  18.77  135.53  189.048  18.77  11.0783  262.457  19.67 
Mediu
m 
18.27  136.74  202.083  18.27  10.087  289.89  20.316 











Results by sector 
  Organisation  Market 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




Intermediate Products  
Small  19.505 
 









138.793  221.538  17.72 
 
10.646  236.586  18.131 
Large  15.541 
(*/se) 
 









Investment goods and consumer durables 
Small  17.328 
 
127.545  160.17  17.328 
 







130.353  172.891  17.606 
 
9.746  325.105  24.660 




175.70  20.548 
 




Non-durable consumption goods 
Small  19.476 
 
135.10  180.848  19.476 
 





141.073  211.821  19.485 
 
9.87  307.978  18.158 












Note: An asterisk  under a figure means that the coefficient is significantly different from that indicated by an abbreviation - small (s), 
medium-sized (m) and large (l) enterprises.  
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Summary of results for Belgium 
 
 
Overall results (for all sectors) 
  Organisation  Market 
 
All sectors 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




               
Small  16.110 
(*/me) 
139.839  259.354  16.110 
(*/me) 
8.2146  279.247  15.423 
Mediu
m 
18.448  145.0288  243.135  18.448  8.0313  329.695  17.0613 








Results by sector 
  Organisation  Market 









Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 






Intermediate Products          
Small  13.278 
 
152.66  398.03  13.378 
 
9.27  180.848  14.38 
Medium  18.495 
(*sle) 
 
157.67  312.51  18.495 
(*/sle) 
 
11.531  222.118  17.228 














Investment goods and consumer durables         
Small  16.53 
 
129.036  175.745  16.53 
 
7.678  328.715  16.028 
Medium  17.423 
 
129.69  171.076  17.423 
 
8.03  383.802  19.915 





179.37  21.753 
(/sme)  




Non-durable consumption goods         
Small  18.523 
 
137.82  204.288  18.523 
 
8.45  328.178  14.848 
Medium  19.426 
 
147.72  245.81  19.426 
 
8.226  383.166  16.243 














Note: An asterisk under a figure means that the coefficient is significantly different from that indicated by an abbreviation - small (s), 
medium-sized (m) and large (l) enterprises.  
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Summary of results for France 
 
 
Overall results (for all sectors) 
  Organisation  Market 
 
All sectors 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




               
Small  22.81  130.592  134.552  22.81  9.001  569.465  20.106 
Mediu
m 
24.20  142.37  174.89  24.20  9.8794  541.572  21.785 















Results by sector 
  Organisation  Market 












Intermediate Products          
Small  22.485 
 
140.093  178.54  22.485 
 





149.82  199.35  25.006 
 
11.115  424.54  20.836 










11.605  223.25 
(*/sme) 
20.581 
Investment goods and consumer durables         
Small  23.23 
 









149.82  140.65  23.931 
 

















Non-durable consumption goods         




124.045  22.733 
 





143.64  184.686  23.668 
 
8.786  602.92  20.546 
















Note: An asterisk under a figure means that the coefficient is significantly different from that indicated by an abbreviation - small (s), 
medium-sized (m) and large (l) enterprises.  
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Summary of results for Germany 
 
 
Overall results (for all sectors) 
  Organisation  Market 
 
All sectors 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




               
Small  24.75 
 
127.088  108.155  24.75 
 





130.27  136.926  21.89 
 
8.031  510.053  17.061 














Results by sector 
  Organisation  Market 












Intermediate Products          
Small  27.886 
 










136.142  153.118  23.664 
 
8.958  443.196  15.252 
Large  13.816 
(*/sme) 
 









Investment goods and consumer durables         
Small  22.162 
 
120.158  91.282  22.162 
 





121.684  117.184  18.522 
 















Non-durable consumption goods         
Small  24.206 
 
124.538  101.394  24.206 
 





133.002  140.478  23.488 
 
7.962  520.356  14.704 












Note: An asterisk under a figure means that the coefficient is significantly different from that indicated by an abbreviation - small (s), 
medium-sized (m) and large (l) enterprises.  
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Summary of results for Italy 
 
 
Overall results (for all sectors) 
  Organisation  Market 
 
All sectors 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




               





158.79  336.604  17.44 
 
9.6733  369.067  27.3238 














Results by sector 
  Organisation  Market 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




Intermediate Products          





371.466  15.05 
(*/me) 
 





165.445  364.908  17.998 
 
 
11.316  282.001 
(*/sle) 
27.371 











224.566  23.655 
(*/sme) 
Investment goods and consumer durables         





262.795  14.08 
(*/me) 
 





148.191  289.346  16.696 
 
8.521  445.601 
(*/sle) 
28.91 
Large  13.026 
(*/me)  






364.388  21.37 
(*/sme) 
Non-durable consumption goods         





325.272  14.076 
(*/mle) 
 






162.755  355.558  17.648 
 
9.181  379.59 
(*/sle) 
25.69 
Large  17.836 
 
170.722  396.128 
(*/sme) 
17.836  10.01 
(*/se) 
300.213  22.731 
(*/sme) 
Note: An asterisk under a figure means that the coefficient is significantly different from that indicated by an abbreviation - small (s), 
medium-sized (m) and large (l) enterprises.  
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Summary of results for Portugal 
 
 
Overall results (for all sectors) 
  Organisation  Market 
 
All sectors 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




               
Small  15.866  145.386  288.503  15.866  11.235  228.499  24.435 
Mediu
m 
16.803  168.974  412.129  16.803  13.073  207.605  30.308 




17.820  15.004 
(*/se) 




Results by sector 
  Organisation  Market 
















Intermediate Products          
Small  15.825 
 
156.80  362.775  15.825 
 
13.91  158.273  24.691 
Medium  21.42 
 
182.18  385.066  21.42 
 
16.468  206.203  28.466 





















137.589  231.81  16.3633 
 





148.878  371.05  13.193 
 
11.55  203.761  38.555 
(*/mle) 
Large  12.863 
(*/se) 
 










Non-durable consumption goods         
Small  15.411 
15.9841 
141.773  270.925  15.411 
16.388 





175.865  480.271  15.796 
15.670 
11.201  212.851  23.905 













Note: An asterisk under a figure means that the coefficient is significantly different from that indicated by an abbreviation - small (s), 
medium-sized (m) and large (l) enterprises.  
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Summary of results for Spain 
 
 
Overall results (for all sectors) 
  Organisation  Market 
 
All sectors 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




               
Small  17.024  140.821  236.983  17.024  10.20  324.533  27.854 
Mediu
m 
15.829  145.942  286.191  15.829  10.133  296.899  29.558 
Large  12.611 
(*/sme) 











Results by sector 
  Organisation  Market 












Intermediate Products          
Small  18.538 
 
149.731  267.575  18.538 
 





152.156  307.22  16.985 
 
12.035  232.243  28.333 
Large  8.918 
(*/sme) 
 











Investment goods and consumer durables         
Small  15.47 
 
127.728  179.413  15.47 
 







130.496  217.06  14.035 
 











335.815  24.983 
(*/sme) 
Non-durable consumption goods         
Small  17.065 
 
145.005  263.961  17.065 
 





155.175  334.293  16.498 
 
9.8066  316.325  27.813 
Large  14.331 
 








Note: An asterisk under a figure means that the coefficient is significantly different from that indicated by an abbreviation - small (s), 
medium-sized (m) and large (l) enterprises.  
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Summary of results for Japan 
 
 
Overall results (for all sectors) 
  Organisation  Market 
 
All sectors 






Real gross profit/ 
capital employed 




               
Small  20.84277  140.834  197.648  20.84277  8.591  303.595  8.564 
Mediu
m 
22.915  160.992  272.243  22.915  9.316  302.496  7.854 













Results by sector 
  Organisation  Market 












Intermediate Products          
Small  21.656  149.211  228.251  21.656  9.485  275.475  7.776 
Mediu
m 
22.431  174.023  332.443  22.431  10.623  268.185  10.603 










152.458  18.855 
(*/sme) 
Investment goods and consumer durables         
Small  21.833  135.838  165.525  21.833  8.553  322.00  8.755 
Mediu
m 











8.936  239.29  10.165 
(*/sme) 
Non-durable consumption goods         
Small  19.038  137.453  199.168  19.038  7.736  313.305  9.1616 
Mediu
m 
19.621  155.388  282.338  19.621  8.571  275.25  7.36 




16.631  10.105 
(*/sme) 
207.435  12.478 
(*/sme) 
Note: An asterisk under a figure means that the coefficient is significantly different from that indicated by an abbreviation - small (s), 
medium-sized (m) and large (l) enterprises. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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